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Hydraulic Fracturing (hydro fracking) has revolutionized oil and gas 
production in the United States. Controversy has been widespread and plenty of 
uncertainty remains commonplace in the public. The topic of hazardous chemicals 
and pollution associated with hydro fracking will be presented in some detail. 
However, the key focus will be on sensors and lightning mitigation at produced 
hydrocarbon storage batteries. Unmitigated fires and explosions will be shown to 
cause $10 million per direct strike in some lightning risk zones. Lightning has stood 
as an unresolved threat to hydrocarbon storage facilities for over 100 years. 
Literature research has shown that 33% of all modern hydrocarbon tank accidents 
  
are due to lightning (Chang and Lin, 2006); in addition, cloud-ground lightning strikes 
are predicted to increase by 50% this century (Romps et al., 2014). An overlay of the 
current National Lightning Detection Network (NLDN) risk map and the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) shale play map clearly show the lightning threat only 
increasing with the migration of future shale activities. While planning may change, 
shale deposits and regional lightning threats are not changing geographically; this 
research quantifies the threat and outlines clear lightning mitigation strategies. 
Furthermore, real-time detection and the associated methodology of lightning 
mitigation have implications for industries far beyond hydro fracking. By leveraging 
industrial standards for Fire and Gas Systems (FGS) such as IEC 61511, the 
proposed lightning effects mitigation system has a pathway toward verification and 
eventual validation at a broad array of industrial sites. Some extended applications 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This Chapter begins with an overview of hydraulic fracturing (fracking) from 
the past to the present along with a review of key terms, risks associated with 
fracking and areas where fracking could benefit from operational optimization.  A 
statement of the problem under investigation is presented followed by envisioned 
beneficiaries of the research.  The Chapter concludes with a description of the 
organization of the entire document. 
 
1.1 Background – Hydraulic Fracturing, Definitions, Risks, 
and Operational Optimization 
In ancient times, lightning strikes would ignite underground seepages of 
natural gas. These self-sustaining fires of seemingly mystical origin mystified the 
ancient Greeks. On occasion this even resulted in the construction of temples 
housing priestess including the Oracle of Delphi whose prophetic powers were 
thought to originate from the flames (Speight, 2007).   
Natural gas is, in many ways, the ideal fossil fuel. It is clean, easy to 
transport, and convenient to use.   From an historical perspective, in 1821 William A. 
Hart drilled a 27 foot deep well in Fredonia, New York  in an effort to get a larger flow 
of gas from a surface seepage of natural gas. This was the first well intentionally 
drilled to obtain natural gas (Victor et al., 2006; Speight, 2007). For most of the 
1800s, natural gas was used almost exclusively as a fuel for lamps. Because there 





It took the construction of pipelines to bring natural gas to new markets. One 
of the first lengthy pipelines was built in 1891, it was in excess of 100 miles 
long and carried gas from fields in central Indiana to Chicago. This first 
pipeline did not initiate an immediate construction boom; rather, there were 
very few pipelines built until after World War II in the 1940s (Tussing and 
Barlow, 1984; Foss and Head, 2004).  
         Improvements in metals, welding techniques and pipe making during 
that war made pipeline construction more economically attractive. In addition, 
necessity due to costal tanker disruptions during World War II caused an 
uptick in large gas pipeline construction; Tennessee Gas Company built a 24 
inch diameter, 1265 mile long natural gas line from the desert southwest to the 
East Coast (Kennedy, 1993).   After World War II, the nation began building its 
pipeline network. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, thousands of miles of 
pipeline were constructed throughout the United States. Today, the U.S. 
pipeline network, a map of which is presented as Fig. 1-1, if laid end-to-end, 






Fig. 1-1.  Natural gas pipelines within the US (source: Energy Information 
Administration) (2009).  
 
       Like oil production, some natural gas flows freely to wells because the natural 
pressure of the underground reservoir forces the gas through the reservoir rocks. 
These types of gas wells require only a "Christmas tree" – such as that shown in Fig. 1-




Fig. 1-2.  Natural gas "Christmas Tree". 
 
In 2015, only a small number of these free-flowing gas formations still exist in many 
U.S. gas fields. This implies that in the vast majority of gas extraction wells in the U.S., 





Often, the flow of gas through a reservoir can be improved by creating tiny 
cracks in the rock, called "fractures," that serve as open pathways for the gas to flow. 
In a technique called "hydraulic fracturing," drillers force high pressure fluids 
(principally water) into the underground geological formation to crack the rock. A 
"propping agent", most commonly a very fine grain sand or even tiny glass beads, is 
added to the fluid to prop open the fractures when the pressure is decreased.   A 
diagrammatic depiction of the process is presented as Fig. 1-3.   
It is worth noting that the process of “treating” carbonate rock formations with 
acid for enhanced oil extraction, was first done in 1895 by the Standard Oil Company 
in Lima, Ohio (Kalfayan, 2007; 1895). Following this, a patent was issued to Herman 
Frasch in 1896 for the process (Dyke, 1896). In 1934 and 1933, Putnam et al. 
published papers describing the techniques and advancements for the acid 
treatment of oil wells (Putnam, 1933; Putnam and Fry, 1934). In the 1934 paper, 
Putnam outlined how over the previous 3 years, 3,000 “lime” oil wells were treated 
with acid resulting in an average production increase of 448% overall (Putnam and 
Fry, 1934). As a further advancement, the first recorded use of hydraulic fracturing – 
“fracking” – with a propping agent (a type of sand) was performed in the late 1940s 
(Kalfayan, 2007).  The practice continued at a modest pace throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s with a significant expansion in volume productivity from unconventional 
(hydro fracked) wells in the late 1960s and 1970s as can be clearly interpreted from 
a 2010 paper by Nehring (NEHRING, 2010) .  Fracking has been performed around 
the world, but became of substantially notoriety in the U.S. in the 2000’s when the 
companion technology of horizontal drilling allowed oil and natural gas extraction to 




drill process has been profound; for example, in 2013 61% of U.S. wells drilled were 
horizontal as compared to 10% in 2004 (Hughes, 2013). 
From the standpoint of a easy to understand definition, the fracking 
procedure itself can be defined as: “…the precise stimulation activity, limited to the 
fluid action in initiating and extending cracks in the rock” (King, 2012). Of course, the 
entire hydro fracking project is much more complicated as will be shown in the 
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The growth pattern of natural gas as the fuel of choice is clearly described in 
(EIA, 2011) and its tradeoffs are debated in (Howarth et al., 2011a). As the U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE) explains, domestic natural gas will grow to displace 
coal in the coming decades (EIA, 2011). Much more recently, the DOE also cited the 
relatively low cost of natural gas and the continued expectation for price reductions 
as a principal reason for its accelerated industrial use.  
This industrial utilization feedback loop – increased use leading to increased 
demand leading to increased production leading to increased supply - is further 
driving the expansion of natural gas use. It is anticipated that by 2040, natural gas 
will overtake coal as the principal source of electricity generation in the United States 
(EIA, 2014).  As previously mentioned, the increasing use of horizontal drilling 
coupled with fracking techniques has led to a recalculation of the world reserves of 






Fig. 1-4.  World reserves of natural gas (Howarth et al., 2011a) 
 
As previously stated, hydraulic fracturing (fracking) - also referred to as  
“hydro fracking” or “hydro-fracking” involves the stimulation of a drilled and 
completed well for the maximum extraction of underground resources including: 
natural gas, oil, and even geothermal energy. From a project management 
perspective, the end-to-end process associated with well preparation and fracking 
has numerous steps, including: injection fluid acquisition, well drilling and 
construction, stimulation and recovery, and environmentally compliant waste 
disposal (2010b).  
The horizontal drilling process can have a dramatic increase on the 
production rates vs. conventional vertical drilling and production operations. For 
example, experts from a major fracking company indicate that “shale plays” 
(geological formations of shale rock where hydrocarbons reside) near Midland, TX 
have greatly benefited from the combination of horizontal drilling and hydro fracking 
technology with the production rate per well increasing by 5-15 times over a 
conventional well. In other words, conventional wells in the Midland, TX area would 
yield 100 bbl of crude per day with horizontal drilling alone, whereas hydro fracking 
and horizontal operations can result in wells that produce 1500 bbl per day. --The 






Fig. 1-5. Depiction of horizontal and vertical fracked wells (Murchison Oil & 
Gas, 2010). 
 
Fig. 1-5 illustrates how horizontal wells have a larger stimulation volume than 
vertical wells. Since shale plays are in layers, horizontal wells can follow the pay 
region more efficiently than vertical wells. To increase production even more, drilling 
locations – referred to as “pads” -  often have 3 or more wells to minimize logistics 
per well and setup communication between wells during fracking. Geological oil/gas 
reservoir engineers sometimes referring to “well communications” in the context that 
within the geological formation, fracking at one well site may influence production 
and extraction from neighboring wells.  Such well communication results in localized 
fracturing of the shale play region between wells, and thus producing even large 
production than single non-communicating wells1.   




                                               
 
 
Fig. 1-6.  Decline curve for Marcellus shale gas wells  
Naturally, a well’s production rate does not remain constant for its entire life, 
from a mathematical prospective, fracked wells can follow a pattern of exponential 
decay 
 
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑊𝑊 =  𝑊𝑊−𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄 
Eq. 1-1. Exponential decay well production curve (Hill et al., 2012) 
 
In Eq. 1, Q is a scalar and determines the overall production decay 






Fig. 1-7. Fracked well production over time (plots of Eq. 1-1) 
 
In addition to these natural log decay functions shown in Fig. 1-7, exploration 
and production companies (E&P companies) also use harmonic and hyperbolic 
curves. The choice in curve is supported by regional geology, and experience with 
adjacent wells (Lee and Wattenbarger, 1996).  
Some of the most common decline curve trend functions are outlined in 
Petroleum Production Systems by Hill et al. (Hill et al., 2012) are shown in Table 1-1.  
 
Curve Type Exponential Harmonic Hyperbolic 
Instantaneous 
production rate 
at time t 
𝑞𝑞(𝑝𝑝) =  𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊−𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑞𝑞(𝑝𝑝) =  
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝











The Estimated Ultimate Recovery (EUR) provides a fair benchmark for 
recoverable resources while providing insight into what the marginal cost might be 
for extended recovery. However as an Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
report indicates (2012), these estimates are highly variable and differ from well to 
well and don’t include the impacts of new technologies (such as sensors) being 
adopted. With all this said, it is easy to see that a fracked well provides the vast 
majority of their payback in the 0-2 year range--- this is truly where money can be 
made or lost. In particular, an end-to-end exploration and production company must 
consider models such as Net Present Value (NPV) to determine the value of a 
particular well.  
  
1.1.1 Operational Optimization  
Before we present NPV in relation to the fracking arena, another term to 
consider is Energy Return on Energy Invested (ERoEI). In simple terms, this is the 
total amount of energy required to produce a unit of recoverable hydrocarbons. 
Guilford et al. has done an exhaustive study of ERoEI for U.S. oil and gas; In their 
paper (Guilford et al., 2011), a total of 13 point estimates for ERoEI were taken over 
a 90 year period. The authors proceed to discuss a simple Eq. and my research 
efforts have built upon their Eq. to be more inclusive of sensors.    
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸 =  
𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝 𝑞𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜 𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑞𝑞 𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝 𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎
𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜 𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑞𝑞 𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞 𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊
 





Within this dissertation, the approach is taken that energy and cost are 
fungible concepts. In particular, a unit of energy can easily be calculated in terms of 
currency or USD. So, it follows that ERoI can be transformed into USD values by 
using the daily traded market value for energy commodities such as WTI (West 
Texas Intermediate) crude and Natural Gas. If we simply transform energy saved 
into terms of money saved we can then see the connection between Eq. 1-1 and 1-2.  
 
This research project now introduces the novel concept of SARoI (Sensor 
Augmented Return on Investment). By building upon the research of Guilford et al., 
how does the introduction of sensors into fracking operations impact the potential for 
financial savings?  In the following Eq., the concept of Sensor Augmented Return on 
Investment (SARoI) is introduced. SARoI parallels ERoI, but the benefit of a sensor 
is calculated in terms of currency rather than energy saved.     
 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸 =  
𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝 𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶 + 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊 + 𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒
 
Eq. 1-4. Sensor Augmented Return on Investment 
 
 







Eq. 1-5. Net Present Value (Mian, 2011) 
St = (gross revenue – LOE – taxes) at the end of year t 
I0 = initial investment outlay at t=0  
id = the discount rate; required minimal rate of return 





In Eq. 1-5., M.A. Mian presents the concept of Net Present Value (NPV) in relation to 
a resource in the petroleum industry (Mian, 2011). We now take Eq. 1-5 and modify it 
for the production profile of a hydro fracked well as follows. The contribution of 
sensors to the NPV of a hydro fracked well project is clearly shown in Eq. 1-6 by the 
integration of Eq. 2 and 5. 
𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉 =  �






Eq. 1-6. Sensors contribute to the NPV of a hydro fracking project. 
 
In Eq. 1-6, a production profile of e-x is assumed; however, as was discussed in 
relation to Fig. 1-9, harmonic and hyperbolic profile curves can also be used (Lee 
and Wattenbarger, 1996).  
1.1.2 Fracking Operations 
As shown in Fig. 1-8, hydro fracking operations can be broken down into 3 
separate operational domains. The intersection – and a key element of this 
dissertation’s research – of transportation and surface operations is the “product 






Fig. 1-8: Hydraulic Fracturing Project Anatomy 
 
 The transportation operational area of Fig. 1-9 principally deals with the 
transportation of materials and supplies for hydro fracking operations including: sand, 
water, chemicals, big iron, equipment / machinery, waste water, solid garbage, 
produced oil, and produced gas.  
 The only portion of transportation that was examined in this dissertation was 
the transportation and storage of produced gas and oil at the battery2 facility; the in-
field experiments conducted for this research observed a distributed star-network 
topology for feed pipelines from operational fracking wells to a centralized storage 
battery.  Pipes were run on the surface – versus being buried – from the well pads to 
2 The battery is an onsite storage and rudimentary purification facility for produced 















                                               
 
the battery where limited chemical separation occurred, and the resultant separated 
constituents pumped into separate storage tanks. 
 While the subsurface – or downhole – operations and the general surface 
operations (such as sand truck placement and unloading) are not central to this 
research, Fig. 1-9 depicts how surface operations, transportation, intersect and 
impact storage.  Individuals interested in finding out more information on these two 
topics should consult (Holloway and Rudd). 
 
 
Fig. 1-9. Components of Surface Operations 
 
Logistics at hydro fracking sites could be greatly improved with better sensors 
and integrated management systems. Currently large hydro fracking companies 
have no master historian working in collaboration with an overall project 













and purpose built sensors deployed at the operational edge are key for a more 
efficient view on operational risk. 
Fracking is not a monolithic process that is invariable through time; rather, 
fracking pads house a large collection of hardware that is moved on and off site as 
required. Some of this equipment includes pumps, hose fittings, tools, drill bits and 
pipe. Tracking the location and inventory of these items is currently done only by 
inspection and is not automated (based on discussions with onsite engineering 
supervisors). While individual companies may have a large number of fracking sites 
in a relatively small geographical area, the sheer volume of wells, such as these 
shown in the photograph of Fig. 1-10 – which this researcher took while flying over 
west Texas immediately shows the potential logistics and informatics difficulties for 
sub-optimally managed projects. 
 
Fig. 1-10.  West Texas fracking sites – Rooke 2014  
  
Transportation of sand, water, chemicals, and other supplies to and from 
fracking sites lack an integrated project management system. Often during fracking 
operations, sand trucks are lined up in a queue waiting to be unloaded at a cost of 




easily be placed onsite and integrated with real-time traffic from public sources like 
Google Traffic to more efficiently schedule trucks.  
 
Fig. 1-12. Photograph of fracking sand trucks being unloaded – Rooke 2014 
 
Gathering pipes, shown in Fig. 1-12, transport all liquid products to the battery. The 
mixture of fluids transported within the gathering pipes includes waste water, crude 






Fig. 1-12. Gathering pipes lead to the Battery (photograph taken by author). 
 
The battery is where it all comes together. The fluid mixture coming from the 
fracked wells - typically between 6-8 well pads (with each pad containing 3 or more 
producing wells) - is gathered at the battery.  Product from each well is transported 
by polyethylene pipes which are for the most part simply ran on the surface as 
shown in Fig. 1-12. Very limited chemical separation is performed at the battery 
where the produced petroleum is stored in the fiberglass tanks of Fig. 1-13. With that 
said, the produced hydrocarbons are not of sufficient quality for immediate 
distribution, and undergo crude separation of heavy hydrocarbons and even sulfur 





Fig. 1-13: The battery (photograph taken by author). 
 
 1.1.3 The fracking process in detail 
The process of fracking itself takes place below ground and is beyond the 
scope of this research project. Underground, the complex world of geology enters 
into the picture; and with that, so do additional complications. However, sensors are 
used underground mostly notably pressure, temperature, and vibration sensors. 
Often, these sensors use fiber optics as both the sensor and the communications 
path (Hill and Meltz, 1997).  
 The “downhole” arena of fracking has been heavily researched; this is where 
the shale deposits reside; and thus, hydrocarbons including: methane, ethane, and 
butane. Also, crude oil is produce, which in some case is the principal object for the 
fracking operation. Of course, this is dependent on geology, and in some Texas 
plays, crude oil amounts to 70% of the revenue per well.  
 Form a percentage perspective, fracking fluid is principally composed of sand 




agents, surfactants, and anticorrosion agents; for a complete list of Halliburton 
chemicals used and their calculated concentration review a paper written by Rooke 
et al. in 2011 (Rooke and Fuhr, 2011) from which Table 1-1 was extracted.  
 
Table 1-1: Calculated concentration of chemicals in fracking fluid; Rooke et al. 
(Rooke and Fuhr, 2011). 
 
 
While the technologies and (many) procedures associated with fracking have just 
been presented, it is worthwhile to take a step-by-step review of the entire hydraulic 























CAT®-3 0.1000% Breaker Catalyst EDTA/Copper chelate 1 mg/m3 20.0% 2.0
CAT®-4 0.0055% Breaker Catalyst Diethylenetriamine 1 ppm (S) 45.0% 0.2
CL-23™ 0.0600% Crosslink Agent
Zirconium, acetate lactate oxo 
ammonium complexes 5 mg/m3 45.0% 2.7
CL-23™ 0.0600% Crosslink Agent Ammonium chloride 10 mg/m3 10 mg/m3 14.0% 0.8
CL-37™ 0.0325% Crosslink Agent Triethanolamine zirconate 5 mg/m3 5 mg/m3 80.0% 2.6
CL-37™ 0.0325% Crosslink Agent Propanol 100 ppm 200 ppm 20.0% 0.7
CL-37™ 0.0325% Crosslink Agent Glycerine 10 mg/m3 15 mg/m3 20.0% 0.7
FR-66™ 0.0600% Friction Reducer
Hydrotreated light petroleum 
distillate 200 mg/m3 20.0% 1.2
LoSurf-300D™ 0.1750% Surfactant
Heavy aromatic petroleum 
naphtha 5 mg/m3 5 mg/m3 20.0% 3.5
LoSurf-300D™ 0.1750% Surfactant Naphthalene 10 ppm 10 ppm 3.0% 0.5





Not listed but 
likely toxic
Not listed but 
likely toxic 2.5% 0.4
HAI-404M™ 1.5000% Corrosion Inhibitor 1-(Benzyl)quinolinium chloride 
Not listed but 
likely toxic
Not listed but 
likely toxic 7.5% 11.3
BE-6™ 0.0018% Biocide 2-Bromo-2-nitro-1,3-propanediol
Not listed but 
likely toxic
Not listed but 
likely toxic 80.0% 0.1
LGC-36UC™ 0.4250% Liquid Gel Concentrate Naphtha, hydrotreated heavy
Not listed might 
be toxic
Not listed might 
be toxic 45.0% 19.1
BE-9™ 0.0750% Biocide
Tributyl tetradecyl phosphonium 
chloride























Companies start the drilling process on typically a 3-acre pad of land, which 
provides space for the many trucks that become part of an oil and gas drilling 
process.  The process begins with vertical drilling. A drilling rig is brought on site to 
drill the well, which will go to depths of up to 10,000 feet below the surface. This 
process can take from a week to 10 days, depending on the site’s operation and 
subsurface geology.  Drilling stops initially below the water table so that the well can 
be encased in cement to prevent anything from the well leaking into the water table. 
Once the casing is completed, a 7-inch drill bit will drill more than a mile to get to the 
leased formation in which to frack or in certain cases, such as the Niobrara or Codell 
formations, stacked hydrocarbon-laced formations beneath several impermeable 
rock formations. Once the drill bit hits bottom, or the “pay zone,” the company will 
drill what is called the “bend,” which is the curve the well takes to get into the 
horizontal portion of the zone. The bend alone could take up to two days to drill.  
Throughout the drilling process, drilling mud is pumped in to cool the drill bit and act 
as a means for the resulting debris to leave the well (Dunn, 2014). 
The horizontal portion of the well is then drilled for an additional 4,000 to 
10,000 feet, then encased in cement, with a 4-inch metal pipe in the center to allow 
for the oil and gas to flow to the surface. At this point, the well is just a hole drilled 
into the ground, with a cement barrier between the pipe, the formations and water 
table.  With the drilling completed, the drilling rig is packed up and activity stops until 
the actual fracking begins.  The time between drilling being completed and fracking 
beginning typically ranges from days to weeks (Dunn, 2014).  
 




The actual fracking process uses a considerable amount of machinery 
capable of driving the fluid down more than a mile, coupled with calculations of the 
exact mixtures of chemicals and water and sand (see Fig. 1-16)  and the pressure it 
takes to crack tiny little fissures into rocks, more than a mile beneath the surface.  
Fine grain sand transported to the well site via trucks along with large amounts of 
water and chemical additives are pumped into the well at high pressures, so as to 
crack the rock in different stages in the horizontal (parallel to the surface) portion of 
the well (Dunn, 2014). 
Conversations between the author and on-site fracking engineers: “To open 
fractures at bottom-hole pressures in the Eagle Ford, Niobrara, and the Permian 
Basin you probably need downhole pressures of 10,000 psi or so to open the rocks”. 
The chemicals do not erode the rock to create the cracks or fracs — it’s the high 
pressure of the water that opens them up. The chemicals, such as guar gum are 
added to help the water to gel, allowing the sand an easier vehicle in which to move. 
(again from the conversation:) “When it’s thicker, it does a better job of carrying sand 
downhole, if you think about a handful of sand at a lake, and you put it in water, the 
sand will settle quickly to the bottom of the lake. We don’t want that to happen in 
factures.” (Dunn, 2014) 
Those cracks, now held open by the fine grain sand, release the trapped oil 
and gas inside, which flow back to the surface after the downward pressure from 
fluids is released from the well.  Soap ingredients are frequently added to the gel to 
prevent bacterial growth in the well, reducing the probability of bacterial-released 





The sand, water, chemicals and production that comes out of the well during 
the fracking of the well - commonly called flowback – plus injection of the fracking 
fluid into the well, requires numerous trucks to carry the water, the sand, and the 
chemicals to mix them all together, and more truck horsepower to combine it all to 
shoot down through a pipe into an 8-inch hole in the ground are used. To prep the 
area, several 500-barrel tanks for water storage or a massive, 40,000-barrel pool to 
store water – preinjection and flowback-  is erected on the periphery of the site. Sand 
storage tanks arrive, then are filled. A typical frac job will utilize from 1.5 million to 6 
million pounds of sand. Due to all of the top-side machinery and processes involved, 
traditional (non) sensor-augmented project management methodologies are far from 
optimal.  
(again, continuing the conversation:)  “When the rest of the crew arrives on 
location, they’ll typically rig up to the well head with a missile.”  The missile is a 
manifold around which most of the activity centers, to ultimately pump fracking fluid 
downhole. Crews will line on each side of the missile five to six semi-trucks, which 
contain the horsepower to create enough pressure to pump the fluid downhole at the 
proper rate. 
In addition to the horsepower trucks, there are sand trucks and trucks 
containing the chemical additives to thicken the water to keep the sand moving in the 
well.  A hydration truck, through which the chemicals are added to the water to “gel,” 
and a blender, which mixes that fluid with the sand, are nearby. All surround the 
missile in a horseshoe shape.  “The blender sends the mixture of sand water to the 
low-pressure side of the missile. From that missile, we have 10-12 connections to the 




the (missile) can send it (through its high-pressure side) downhole at pressures that 
can crack the rock open.” 
That one process is good for one frack, or stage, at which the horizontal well 
is cracked from being hit at such high pressures.  A typical well can have 20 fracks, 
each necessitating this procedure of blending, pressurizing and cracking. A typical 
frack job can last up to 20 hours — one frack stage per hour — from start to finish. 
At the open end, or the top of the horseshoe, is a data center, or a trailer containing 
about five to six people controlling the science of the job. There’s usually a 
representative or two from the oil and gas company, a frack job supervisor and an 
engineer.  On jobs where crews utilize a large pool of water, the water is usually 
being heated to temperatures of about 70 degrees to provide the perfect chemical 
combination with the additives and sand.  At some point in the drilling and completion 
process, crews will build oil and gas storage tanks, vapor recovery units to control air 
emissions, and oil and gas separators for the eventual well production. All will be 
strategically located around the wellhead. 
 
Completion: 
Once all the fracks are created, the downward pressure is removed from the 
well. Within a couple of days, the release of that pressure will reverse, allowing the 
oil and gas to flow from the rocks and up the well.  (from the conversation;) “At end of 
the frac job, the flow stream is reversed.  Instead of pumping things downhole, due to 
the pressure we created, we have almost no pressure at the surface, then the flow 
reverts and oil and gas and some of the water find their way back from downhole to 
the surface.”  All the equipment is removed from the site, leaving only the wellhead, 




Unrefined produce hydrocarbons are gathered from 6 or more well heads and 
transported in 3-inch polyethylene gathering pipes to a local battery facility (see Fig. 
1-13).  These hydrocarbons are stored in the battery which was briefly discussed in 
section 1.1.2, and will be covered in detail throughout this dissertation. 
1.1.4 Risk of lightning  
The mixture of chemicals present in a storage battery pose a threat to the 
environment – if spilled, etc – as well as a financial risk to the fracking company, 
again if spilled, etc.  A particular risk to both the environment and the fracking 
company arises if the storage tank explodes and/or catches on fire (Argyropoulos et 
al., 2012).  Such situations have occurred numerous times due to lightning strikes 
(Chang and Lin, 2006), such a burning storage battery fire is shown in Fig. 1-15. 
   
    (a)      (b) 
Fig. 1-14.  Fracking batteries on fire (a) Texas, (b) North Dakota.  Both fires were 
caused by lightning strikes. 
 
As a fact of nature, lightning strikes are difficult to avoid, and are by far the 
primary cause of catastrophic storage tank incidents (Chang and Lin, 2006). Chapter 
3 of this dissertation will highlight how others have made efforts to ground tanks with 




substantially lessened if instrumentation could have sensed the increase in the 
electric field and static charge increasing on the storage tanks, relayed that 
information to a control system which could adjust the ratios of the constituent fluids 
in each tank thereby lessening the probability of a fire if struck by lightning.  --This 
forms the essence of the dissertation’s research question.  It is also immediately 
apparent that the organizations and individuals who would benefit from the research 
question “answer” are: us, the environment and the fracking company. 
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem Under Investigation 
Large scale hydraulic fracturing sites with inherent exposure to potentially 
catastrophic events such as lightning, lack sensor integration with decision 
algorithms. Many parameters at a fracking site are observed by an operator and 
action is taken manually. After discussions with engineers of numerous fracking 
company owner-operators including Pioneer Natural Resources (PXD), Exxon, and 
Halliburton, it quickly became apparent that a lack of trust and actualization is 
preventing change. Scholarly studies have shown that the decision of operators to 
trust automated controls is dependent on their general trust in automation and their 
own self-confidence (Bisantz and Seong, 2001). In particular, senior and often more 
risk adverse engineers have an attitude of “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”. Control 
systems including Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems 
operate under the premises of maximum availability with limited features. Operators 
in the industrial controls arena are highly risk adverse, and thus do not embrace 
change. However, tradition must change as sensors with automatous decision 




The problem being addressed by this thesis involves the integration of 
customized electric field sensors and communications to allow for the measurement 
of static field increases on fiberglass tanks used in hydraulic fracturing storage 
batteries.  The instrumentation must be correctly deployed with local communications 
– to allow an on-battery control system to adjust the constituent chemicals in the 
storage tanks to reduce the combustibility of the fuel being stored (for the ignition 
source, lightning, and the oxygen present (the storage tanks are in the field) cannot 
be controlled) – per Fig. 1-16’s Explosion Triangle – but thereby reduce the risk 
associated with a lightning-induced fire at a fracking site storage battery. 
 
Fig. 1-15.  The Explosion Triangle. 
 
While the specific use of this dissertation’s research is immediate (and 
obvious), the more general point is the integration of a sensor-based automated 
operations management systems to reduce risk.  Once proven in this specific 




1.3   Beneficiaries of this Research 
Hydro fracking operations will be the immediate beneficiaries of this research. 
In addition there will be broader implications associated with this sensor-based 
automated mitigation and protection systems. Benefits to the fracking industry will 
include lower operational risk cost through better detection of lightning and higher 
profits through less unnecessary downtime due to lightning strikes.  
 
1.4 Organization of the Document 
 This dissertation is comprised of 6 Chapters.  Chapter 1 presented an 
overview of fracking and an initial description of the research problem.  Chapter 2 
presents a more thorough “deep dive” into the importance of the research problem 
and the potential impact of being able to obtain an answer to the research questions 
associated with the project.  Chapter 3 is a review of the pertinent literature and prior 
efforts.  The approach and methodology used in the pursuit of an answer to the 
research question is presented in Chapter 4.  The research findings are presented in 











Chapter 2:  Description of the Research Questions 
Addressed 
This chapter begins with an extensive review of the safety of hydraulic 
fracturing storage facilities. The research questions alluded to in Chapter 1 are more 
fully explained in section 2.2.  Implications of “an answer” to these questions are 
presented and the chapter concludes with a summary. 
 
2.1 The Safety of Hydraulic Fracturing Storage Facilities 
The primary topic of this dissertation’s research involves the risks and safety 
of the storage facilities – the batteries – associated with hydraulic fracturing and the 
application of sensor technologies for improved operation and safety.  It is worthwhile 
to review the wider scope of hazards associated – correctly or incorrectly attributed 
to drilling, fracking, producing wells for particularly in the case of the fracking fluids, 
the chemicals will to varying amounts be present in the batteries. As this is important 
in light of accidents associated with storage facilities. 
2.1.1 Risks & Hazards of the fracking process 
The process of fracturing a well is far from benign. The following sections 
provide an overview of some of the issues and impacts related to this well stimulation 
technique. Fig. 2-1 provides a window into the massive scale of a hydro fracking 
operation. Here a well has been completed and capped and is ready for production. 
At this stage, the well is filled with a column of drilling mud to holdback the massive 
internal pressures imparted upon the fracked oil and gas deposit. During the 
production phase, of this well, the mud will be removed as oil and gas enter the well 







Fig. 2-1. Fracking pad with well head 
 
Water Use: 
In 2010, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimated that 70 to 140 
billion gallons of water are used to fracture 35,000 wells in the United States each 
year. This equals the approximate annual water consumption of 40 to 80 cities each 
with a population of 50,000. Fracture treatments in coalbed methane wells use from 
50,000 to 350,000 gallons of water per well, while deeper horizontal shale wells can 
use anywhere from 2,000,000 to 10,000,000 gallons of water to fracture a single 




ecological impacts to aquatic resources, as well as dewatering of drinking water 
aquifers. It has been estimated that the transportation of two to five million gallons of 
water (fresh or waste water) requires 1,400 truck trips averaging a distance of 35 
miles. Thus, not only does water used for hydraulic fracturing deplete fresh water 
supplies and impact aquatic habitat, the transportation of so much water also creates 
localized air quality, safety and road repair issues (Rahm, 2011), (Nicot and Scanlon, 
2012). 
 
Sand and Proppants: 
Conventional oil and gas wells use, on average, 300,000 pounds of proppant, 
coalbed fracture treatments use anywhere from 75,000 to 320,000 pounds of 
proppant and shale gas wells can use more than 4,000,000 pounds of proppant per 
well. Frac sand mines are springing up across the country, from Wisconsin to Texas, 
bringing with them their own set of impacts. Mining sand for proppant use generates 
its own range of impacts, including water consumption and air emissions, as well as 




In addition to large volumes of water, a variety of chemicals are used in 
hydraulic fracturing fluids.  The oil and gas industry and trade groups are quick to 
point out that chemicals typically make up just 0.5 and 2.0% of the total volume of 
the fracturing fluid.  When millions of gallons of water are being used, however, the 




gallon fracturing operation would use from 80 to 330 tons of chemicals (Sawyer, 
2009) 
 
As part of New York State’s Draft Supplemental Generic Environmental 
Impact Statement (SGEIS) related to Horizontal Drilling and High-Volume Hydraulic 
Fracturing in the Marcellus Shale, the Department of Environmental Conservation 
complied a list of chemicals and additives used during hydraulic fracturing. The table 
below provides examples of various types of hydraulic fracturing additives proposed 
for use in New York. 
   
ADDITIVE 
TYPE 
DISCRIPTION OF PURPOSE EXAMPLES OF 
CHEMICALS 
Proppant “Props” open fractures and allows gas / fluids to 





Acid Cleans up perforation intervals of cement and 
drilling mud prior to fracturing fluid injection, and 
provides accessible path to formation. 
Hydrochloric acid 
(HCl, 3% to 28%) 
or muriatic acid 
Breaker Reduces the viscosity of the fluid in order to 
release proppant into fractures and enhance the 




Inhibits growth of organisms that could produce 
gases (particularly hydrogen sulfide) that could 
contaminate methane gas. Also prevents the 
growth of bacteria which can reduce the ability 




Buffer / pH 
Adjusting 
Agent 
Adjusts and controls the pH of the fluid in order 
to maximize the effectiveness of other additives 








Prevents swelling and migration of formation 














Reduces rust formation on steel tubing, well 
casings, tools, and tanks (used only in fracturing 
fluids that contain acid). 
Oxygen 
Scavengers 
Crosslinker The fluid viscosity is increased using phosphate 
esters combined with metals. The metals are 
referred to as crosslinking agents. The 
increased fracturing fluid viscosity allows the 







Allows fracture fluids to be injected at optimum 






Increases fracturing fluid viscosity, allowing the 






Prevents the precipitation of carbonates and 
sulfates (calcium carbonate, calcium sulfate, 






Solvent Additive which is soluble in oil, water & acid-
based treatment fluids which is used to control 
the wettability of contact surfaces or to prevent 





Surfactant Reduces fracturing fluid surface tension thereby 





Table 2-1. Fracking chemicals proposed for fracking in New York State (Earthworks). 
 
Many fracturing fluid chemicals are known to be toxic to humans and wildlife, 
and several are known to cause cancer.  Potentially toxic substances include 
petroleum distillates such as kerosene and diesel fuel (which contain benzene, 
ethylbenzene, toluene, xylene, naphthalene and other chemicals); polycyclic 
aromatic hydrocarbons; methanol; formaldehyde; ethylene glycol; glycol ethers; 
hydrochloric acid; and sodium hydroxide. 
Very small quantities of some fracking chemicals are capable of 
contaminating millions of gallons of water.  According to the Environmental Working 




(also known as hydrotreated light distillates, mineral spirits, and a petroleum distillate 
blends) are likely to contain benzene, a known human carcinogen that is toxic in 
water at levels greater than five parts per billion (or 0.005 parts per million). 
Other chemicals, used in fracking such as 1,2-Dichloroethane, are volatile organic 
compounds (VOCs). Volatile organic constituents have been shown to be present in 
fracturing fluid flowback wastes at levels that exceed drinking water standards. For 
example, testing of flowback samples from Texas have revealed concentrations of 
1,2-Dichloroethane (DCA) at 1,580 ppb, which is more than 316 times EPA’s 
Maximum Contaminant Level for 1,2-Dichloroethane in drinking water. VOCs not 
only pose a health concern while in the water, the volatile nature of the constituents 
means that they can also easily enter the air. According to researchers at the  
University of Pittsburgh's Center for Healthy Environments and Communities, 
organic compounds brought to the surface in the fracturing flowback or produced 
water often go into open impoundments (frac ponds), where the volatile organic 
chemicals can offgas into the air. 
When companies have an excess of unused hydraulic fracturing fluids, they 
either use them at another job or dispose of them. These same fluids (in diluted 
form) are allowed to be injected directly into or adjacent to USDWs3 (Underground 
Source of Drinking Water). Under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SWDA), hazardous 
wastes may not be injected into USDWs (EPA, 2012). Moreover, even if hazardous 
wastes are decharacterized (for example, diluted with water so that they are 
rendered non-hazardous), wastes must still be injected into a formation that is below 
3 A USDW is any aquifer which contains less than 10,000 mg/l total dissolved solids 
and is currently being used as a drinking water source or is of adequate quantity and 
quality for public consumption in the future  
35 
 
                                               
 
the USDW. Clearly, some hydraulic fracturing fluids contain chemicals deemed to be 
"hazardous wastes." To accommodate for this risk, the EPA has developed injection 
well Class categories with stringent guidelines (EPA, 2012) . In particular Class I 
owner-operators must demonstrate the financial capability to complete and plug the 
well (Tsang et al., 2002). On the other extreme, Class V owner-operators have the 
least oversight provided they adhere to the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) (EPA, 
2013).    
Class of disposal well Application and Description 
Class I Injection of municipal or industrial waste 
(including hazardous waste) below the 
deepest USDW. 
Class II Injection related to oil and gas 
production, including enhanced 
hydrocarbon recovery and hydrocarbon 
storage. 
Class III Injection of fluids for the extraction of 
minerals. 
Class IV Injection of hazardous or radioactive 
waste into or above a USDW (banned 
by regulation and statutes). 
Class V All other wells used for injection of 
fluids. These are generally shallow 
wells used to inject nonhazardous 
fluids into or above a USDW. 
Table 2-2. EPA injection well classifications (Tsang et al., 2002). 
 
Health Concerns: 
Human exposure to fracking chemicals can occur by ingesting chemicals that 
have spilled and entered drinking water sources, through direct skin contact with the 
chemicals or wastes (e.g., by workers, spill responders or health care professionals), 





In 2011, Colborn et al. published a paper entitled “Natural Gas Operations 
from a Public Health Perspective” (Colborn et al., 2011). In this paper, they 
summarized health effect information for 353 chemicals used to drill and fracture 
natural gas wells in the United States. Health effects were broken into 12 categories: 
skin, eye and sensory organ, respiratory, gastrointestinal and liver, brain and 
nervous system, immune, kidney, cardiovascular and blood, cancer, mutagenic, 
endocrine disruption, other, and ecological effects.  The chart below illustrates the 
possible health effects associated with the 353 natural gas-related chemicals for 
which Colborn and her co-authors were able to gather health-effects data. 
 
Fig. 2-2. Possible health effects of chemicals natural gas operations (Colborn et al., 
2011) 
 
Colborn’s paper provides a list of 71 potentially hazardous drilling and fracturing 
chemicals, i.e., those that are associated with 10 or more health effects. 















































































Sodium chlorite (chlorous 



















Table 2-3. Chemicals used in natural gas development (Colborn et al., 2011). 
 
While Colborn and her co-workers focused on chemicals used in natural gas 
development, the chemicals used to fracture oil wells are very similar or the same.  
Information regarding hydraulic fracturing fluid chemicals posted on the FracFocus4 
web site indicates that Bakken Shale oil wells may contain toxic chemicals such as 
hydrotreated light distillate, methanol, ethylene glycol, 2-butoxyethanol (2-BE), 
phosphonium, tetrakis(hydroxymethyl)-sulfate (aka phosphonic acid),  acetic acid, 
ethanol, and napthlene 
 
Surface Water and Soil Contamination: 
Spills of fracturing chemicals and wastes during transportation, fracturing 
operations and waste disposal have contaminated soil and surface waters. In 2013, 
41 spills impacted surface water in Colorado alone. This section provides a few 
examples of spills related to hydraulic fracturing that have led to environmental 
impacts (Ferner, 2014). 
 Two spills kill fish: In September 2009, Cabot Oil and Gas spilled hydraulic 
fracturing fluid gel LGC-35 twice at the company’s Heitsman gas well. The two 
incidents released between 6,000 and 8,000 gallons of the fracturing fluid, polluting 
Stevens Creek (near Domock, PA) resulting in a fish kill.  LGC-35, a well lubricant 









                                               
 
did not enter the creek. As a consequence, Cabot faced $4,000 in civil penalties and 
$915 in emergency response costs levied by the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection (DEP) (Wilber, 2009). 
 In another incident, a wastewater pit overflowed at Atlas Resources’ Cowden 
17 gas well, and an unknown quantity of hydraulic fracturing fluid wastes entered 
Dunkle Run, a “high quality watershed”. The company failed to report the spill. In 
August 2010 the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) levied 
a $97,350 fine against Atlas Resources (2010a; Wilber, 2012). 
 Another fracturing fluid spill impacts a high quality waterway: In May 2010, 
Range Resources was fined was fined $141,175 for failing to immediately notify the 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection when the company spilled 
250 barrels of diluted fracturing fluids due to a broken joint in a transmission line. The 
fluids flowed into an unnamed tributary of Brush Creek in Washington County 
Pennsylvania, killing at least 168 fish, salamanders and frogs.  The watercourse is 
designated as a warm-water fishery under Pennsylvania’s special protection waters 
program (Rahm, 2011). 
 Fracturing fluids affect soil and pond: In May 2011, a mechanical problem at 
a Pennsylvania natural gas well caused thousands of gallons of briny water and 
fracking fluid of unknown composition to spew out of the well, overwhelm 
containment facilities and flow across a field and into a pond. The local emergency 
management agency told seven families to evacuate their homes. It took a response 
team -- Houston-based Boots and Coots -- 13 hours to reach the site. Six days went 









As mentioned previously, hydraulic fracturing is used in many coalbed 
methane (CBM) production areas. Some coal beds contain groundwater of high 
enough quality to be considered underground sources of drinking water (USDWs). 
In 2004, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released a final 
study on Evaluation of Impacts to Underground Sources of Drinking Water by 
Hydraulic Fracturing of Coalbed Methane Reservoirs. In the study, EPA found that 
ten out of eleven CBM basins in the U.S. are located, at least in part, within USDWs. 
Furthermore, the EPA determined that in some cases, hydraulic fracturing chemicals 
are injected directly into USDWs during the course of normal fracturing operations 
(see chapter 1 for a listing of fracking chemicals). 
Calculations performed by EPA and reported in the study show that at least 
nine hydraulic fracturing chemicals may be injected into or close to USDWs at 
concentrations that pose a threat to human health. The chart below is a reproduction 
of the data from the EPA draft study. Chemicals may be injected at concentrations 
that are anywhere from 4 to almost 13,000 times the acceptable concentration in 
drinking water. Not only does the injection of these chemicals pose a short-term 
threat to drinking water quality, it is quite possible that there could be long-term 
negative consequences for USDWs from these fracturing fluids. According to the 
EPA study, studies conducted by the oil and gas industry, and interviews with 
industry and regulators, 20 to 85% of fracturing fluids may remain in the formation, 
which means the fluids could continue to be a source of groundwater contamination 




The potential long-term consequences of dewatering and hydraulic fracturing 
on water resources have been summed up by professional hydrogeologist who spent 
32 years with the U.S. Geological Survey: 
At greatest risk of contamination are the coalbed aquifers currently used as 
sources of drinking water. For example, in the Powder River Basin (PRB) the 
coalbeds are the best aquifers. CBM production in the PRB will destroy most of 
these water wells; BLM predicts drawdowns...that will render the water wells in the 
coal unusable because the water levels will drop 600 to 800 feet. The CBM 
production in the PRB is predicted to be largely over by the year 2020. By the year 
2060 water levels in the coalbeds are predicted to have recovered to within 95% of 
their current levels; the coalbeds will again become useful aquifers. However, 
contamination associated with hydrofracturing in the basin could threaten the 
usefulness of the aquifers for future use. 
As mentioned previously, more than 90% of fracking fluids remain in the 
ground. Some fracturing gels remain stranded in the formation, even when 
companies have tried to flush out the gels using water and strong acids. Also, 
studies show that gelling agents in hydraulic fracturing fluids decrease the 
permeability of coals, which is the opposite of what hydraulic fracturing is supposed 
to do (i.e., increase the permeability of the coal formations).  Other similar, unwanted 
side effects from water- and chemical-based fracturing include: solids plugging up 
the cracks; water retention in the formation; and chemical reactions between the 
formation minerals and stimulation fluids. All of these cause a reduction in the 





In many oil and gas producing regions, there has been a degradation of air 
quality as drilling increases. For example, in Texas, high levels of benzene have 
been measured in the air near wells in the Barnett Shale gas fields. These volatile air 
toxics may be originating from a variety of gas-field source such as separators, 
dehydrators, condensers, compressors, chemical spills, and leaking pipes and 
valves. 
Increasingly, research is being conducted on the potential air emissions 
released during the fracturing flow back stage, when wastewater returns to the 
surface. Shales contain numerous organic hydrocarbons, and additional chemicals 
are injected underground during shale gas drilling, well stimulation (e.g., hydraulic 
fracturing), and well workovers. 
The Pittsburgh University Center for Healthy Environments and Communities 
(CHEC) has been examining how organic compounds in the shale can be mobilized 
during fracturing and gas extraction processes. According to the CHEC researchers, 
these organic compounds are brought to the surface in the fracturing flowback or 
produced water, and often go into open impoundments (frac ponds), where the 
waste water, “will offgas its organic compounds into the air. This becomes an air 
pollution problem, and the organic compounds are now termed Hazardous Air 
Pollutants (HAP’s).” 
The initial draft of the New York draft supplemental environmental impacts 
statement related to drilling in the Marcellus Shale (which is no longer available on-
line) included information on modeling of potential air impacts from fracturing fluid 
wastes stored in centralized impoundments. One analysis looked at the volatile 
organic compound methanol, which is known to be present in fracturing fluids such 




calculated that a centralized fracturing flowback waste impoundment serving 10 wells 
(5 million gallons of flowback per well) could have an annual emission of 32.5 tons of 
methanol. 
The U.S. EPA reports that “chronic inhalation or oral exposure to methanol 
may result in headache, dizziness, giddiness, insomnia, nausea, gastric 
disturbances, conjunctivitis, visual disturbances (blurred vision), and blindness in 
humans.” Open pits, tanks or impoundments that accept flowback wastes from one 
well would have a much smaller emission of volatile organic compounds (VOC) like 
methanol than facilities accepting wastes from multiple wells. But there are 
centralized flowback facilities like those belonging to Range Resources in 
Washington County, Pennsylvania that have been designed for “long-term use,” and 
thus, are likely to accept wastes from more than one well. 
New York’s air modeling further suggested that the emission of Hazardous 
Air Pollutants (HAPs) from centralized flowback impoundments could exceed 
ambient air thresholds 1,000 meters (3,300 feet) from the impoundment, and could 
cause the impoundment to qualify as a major source of HAPs. 
Methanol is just one of the VOCs contained in flowback water.  The combined 
emissions from all VOCs present in flowback stored at centralized impoundments 
could be very large, depending on the composition of the fracturing fluids used at the 
wells. Data released on flowback water from wells in Pennsylvania reveal that 
numerous volatile organic chemicals are returning to the surface, sometime in high 
concentrations.  The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection looked 





Again referring to the Colburn paper, 37% of the chemicals used during 
natural gas drilling, fracturing and production (for which health data were available) 
were found to be volatile, with the ability to become airborne.  they compared the 
potential health impacts of volatile chemicals with those chemicals more like to be 
found in water (i.e., chemicals with high solubility). Their study reported that “far 
more of the volatile chemicals (81%) can cause harm to the brain and nervous 
system.  71% of the volatile chemicals can harm the cardiovascular system and 
blood, and 66% can harm the kidneys,” producing a profile that “displays a higher 
frequency of health effects than the water soluble chemicals.”  The researchers add 
that the chance of exposures to volatile chemicals are increased by case they can be 
inhaled, ingested and absorbed through the skin. It’s worth noting that citizens of the 
gas field are experiencing health effects related to volatile chemicals from pits 
(Colborn et al., 2011). 
 In 2005, numerous Colorado residents experienced severe odors and health 
impacts related to flowback and drilling pits and tanks in Garfield County.  According 
to Dion and Debbie Enlow complained to the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation 
Commission about odors from a Barrett wellpad upwind from their home. The pad 
had four wells that were undergoing completion/hydraulic fracturing. Dion Enlow 
complained to the company that the smell was so bad that "I can't go outside and 
breathe." 
 In Pennsylvania, a fracturing flowback wastewater pit just beyond June 
Chappel’s property line created odors similar to gasoline and kerosene, which forced 
her inside, left a greasy film on her windows, on one occasion created a white dust 
that fell over her yard. Chappel and her neighbors lived with the noxious odors until 




 In March 2010, a fracturing flowback wastewater impoundment in 
Washington County, Pennsylvania caught fire and exploded producing a cloud of 
thick, black smoke that could be seen miles away. For several days prior to the 
explosion nearby citizens had tried to alert state officials about noxious odors from 




It has been reported that anywhere from 25 – 100% of the chemical-laced 
hydraulic fracturing fluids return to the surface from Marcellus Shale operations 
(Cooley, 2012). Based on the data in a paper by Nicot et al., Table 2-4 clearly shows 
the variability of water use per well in Texas plays; however, the magnitude of water 












Table 2-4. Water usage in Texas shale plays per well (Nicot and Scanlon, 
2012; Cooley, 2012)   
 
This means that for some shale gas wells, millions of gallons of wastewater 
are generated, and require either treatment for re-use, or disposal.  As the industry 
expands, the volume of waste generated is also increasing rapidly. Between 2010 
and 2011, the waste volume increased by 70% in Pennsylvania to reach more than 
610 million gallons. 
The sheer volume of wastes, combined with high concentrations of certain chemicals 
in the flowback from fracturing operations, are posing major waste management 
challenges for the Marcellus Shale states.  Also, the US Geological Survey has 
found that flowback may contain a variety of formation materials, including brines, 
heavy metals, radionuclides, and organics, which can make wastewater treatment 
difficult and expensive (Howarth et al., 2011a; Brown, 2014). 
According to an article in ProPublica, New York City’s Health Department has 
raised concerns about the concentrations of radioactive materials in wastewater from 
natural gas wells (Lustgarten, 2009). In a July, 2009 letter obtained by ProPublica, 
the Department wrote that “Handling and disposal of this wastewater could be a 




disposing of the waste, that thorough testing will be needed at water treatment 
plants, and that workers may need to be monitored for radiation as much as they 
might be at nuclear facilities (Lustgarten, 2009). 
Options for disposal of radioactive flowback or produced water include 
underground injection in Class II UIC wells and offsite treatment (refer to Table 2-2 
for UIC classifications). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has indicated that 
Class II UIC injection disposal wells are uncommon in New York, and existing wells 
aren't licensed to receive radioactive waste. A research article by Ellsworth published 
in a 2013 issue of Science indicates that injection wells have also been linked to 
earthquakes (Ellsworth, 2013). In terms of offsite treatment, it is not known if any of 
New York’s water treatment facilities are capable of handling radioactive wastewater. 
Pennsylvania state regulators and the natural gas industry are also facing challenges 
regarding how to ensure proper disposal of the millions of gallons of chemical-laced 
wastewater generated daily from hydraulic fracturing and gas production in the 
Marcellus shale. Drinking water treatment facilities in Pennsylvania are not equipped 
to treat and remove many flowback contaminants, but rather, rely on dilution of 
chlorides, sulfates and other chemicals in surface waters used for drinking water 
supplies. 
During the fall of 2008, the disposal of large volumes of flowback and 
produced water at publicly owned treatment works (POTWs) contributed to high total 
dissolved solids (TDS) levels measured in Pennsylvania’s Monongahela River and 
its tributaries. Studies showed that in addition to the Monongahela River, many of the 
other rivers and streams in Pennsylvania had a very limited ability to assimilate 
additional TDS, sulfate and chlorides, and that the high concentrations of these 




University and Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority experts suggests that the 
natural gas industry has contributed to elevated levels of bromide in the Allegheny 
and Beaver Rivers.  Bromides react with disinfectants used by municipal treatment 
plants to create brominated trihalomethanes, which have been linked to several 
types of cancer and birth defects. 
In August of 2010, Pennsylvania enacted new rules limiting the discharge of 
wastewater from gas drilling to 500 milligrams per liter of total dissolved solids (TDS) 
and 250 milligrams per liter for chlorides. The number of municipal facilities allowed 
to take drilling and fracking wastewater has dropped from 27 in 2010 to 15 in 2011. 
Disposal of drilling and fracking waste water is going to continue to present a 
challenge to local and state governments as more wells are developed across the 
country. 
Chemical Disclosure: 
Fracking companies have been reluctant to share the chemical composition 
of their fracking fluids often citing trade secret protection. A Natural Research 
Defense Council paper published in 2012 explains disclosure and rules on 
enforcement (McFeeley, 2012).   One potentially frustrating issue for surface owners 
is that it has not been easy to find out what chemicals are being used during the 
hydraulic fracturing operations in your neighborhood. According to the Natural 
Resources Defense Council, in the late 1990s and early 2000s attempts by various 
environmental and ranching advocacy organizations to obtain chemical compositions 
of hydraulic fracturing fluids were largely unsuccessful because oil and gas 






Hydraulic Fracturing Best Practices: 
From a public health perspective, if hydraulic fracturing stimulation takes 
place, the best option is to fracture formations using sand and water without any 
additives, or sand and water with non-toxic additives. Non-toxic additives are being 
used by the offshore oil and gas industry, which has had to develop fracturing fluids 
that are non-toxic to marine organisms. It is common to use diesel in hydraulic 
fracturing fluids. This should be avoided, since diesel contains the carcinogen 
benzene, as well as other harmful chemicals such as naphthalene, toluene, 
ethylbenzene and xylene. According to the company Halliburton, "Diesel does not 
enhance the efficiency of the fracturing fluid; it is merely a component of the delivery 
system." It is technologically feasible to replace diesel with non-toxic "delivery 
systems," such as plain water. According to the EPA, "Water-based alternatives exist 
and from an environmental perspective, these water-based products are preferable." 
For example, Air Products offers a Nitrogen based fracking fluid with a gas phase of 
nitrogen in the range of 53% to 95% by volume. Thus, alternatives such as the 
nitrogen based fracking fluid by Air Products can drastically decrease water 
consumption (Kothare, 2012).   
2.1.2 Fire and Gas Safety systems (FGS) 
Before we can discuss FGS systems, highlights of the IEC 61511 technical 
standard must be presented. The IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission) is 
a worldwide standardization committee that collaborates closely with the 
Organization for Standardization (ISO). IEC 61511 addresses safety instrumented 
systems which deploy electrical/electronic/programmable electronic systems that 




with safety as a goal. The standard further describes the need for a: risk 
assessment, operational requirements, framework, and safety management / 
activities (Smith and Simpson, 2010). In the context of IEC 61511, FGS systems are 
considered to be mitigative SIS (Safety Instrumented System); in other words, they 
respond to an event after it has occurred.  This has applications in industrial settings 
where personnel must be evacuated or control elements can finalize an Emergency 
Shut Down (ESD) as described in section 2.1.3.   
IEC 61508 is a sister standard of IEC 61511 with a focus on the design of 
hardware and software for safety system while IEC 61511 is relevant to users and 
integrators. Together, these two standards support the internationally recognized 
development and deployment of SIS(s) (Gall, 2008).  
2.1.3 Emergency Shut Down (ESD) Systems 
An ESD System is designed to minimize the impact of an industrial anomaly 
after it has occurred. When integrated with logic solvers running voting functionality, 
ESD systems can function in preventative manner to control multi- dimensional 
impacts. The system leverages sensor, logic solvers, and final control elements also 
called a safety instrumented function (SIF). Each SIF works to reduce risk by 
preventing a specific hazard from occurring if called upon by the logic solver. Further, 
a SIL (Safety Integrity Level) is set for a certain facet of the system that centers 






Table 2-5. Safety Integrity Levels (Jin et al., 2003) 
By quickly reviewing Table 2-5, it’s clear to see that the decision of a SIL falls 
within the realm of design; this is because IEC 61508 focuses on hardware and 
software for a system rather than integration.  
From a process planning standpoint let us now focus on Fig. 2-3. Here the 
practitioner is to adhere to IEC 61511 and design in requirements and a general 
philosophy for functionality of the FGS system. The first step in designing a system in 
accordance with Fig. 2-3 is to codify operational requirements for the FGS system. 
By following IEC 61511 and a design flowchart like Fig. 2-3 (left hand side), a 
systems engineer can refine a FGS solution in line with operational goals of risk and 
safety. Furthermore, critical questions can be answered before costly hardware and 
software solutions are implemented by following IEC 61508.  Some items for 
consideration for during this stage of the FGS process are (Kenexis, 2013):  
• Regulatory Requirements 
• Standardized Design Practices 
• Corporate standards or policy 





• Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) Recommendations 





Fig. 2-3. Design and implementation of FGS (Kenexis, 2013). 
 
Fig. 2-4 serves as the backdrop for a disccussion of Independent Protection 
Layers (IPL). Each IPL can be passive or active, but must be independent of all 
others. Each IPL must play some sort of role in mitigation of a particular risk or 
hazard (Summers, 2003). The following list outlines the baisc criteria of an IPL 






Now that an IPL has been defined, its place in a risk mitigation strategy becomes 
more apparent. At both the design and operational phases of IPL solutions, systems 
engineers and project managers work together to to define the risk strategy. 
Probabailites can be assgned to the success and failure of each IPL; this will result in 
a nested calculation which reviels the current operational risk of a system. 
Additional details will be presented in Chapter 4 when research methodogies 
are presented.  
Criteria of an Independent Protection Layer (IPL) according to Summers 
(Summers, 2003) 
 
• Specificity. The IPL is capable of detecting and preventing or mitigating the 
consequences of specified, potentially hazardous event(s), such as a runaway 
reaction, loss of containment, or an explosion. 
 
• Independence. An IPL is independent of all the other protection layers 
associated with the identified potentially hazardous event. Independence requires 
that the performance is not affected by the failure of another protection layer or 
by the conditions that caused another protection layer to fail. Most importantly, 
the protection layer is independent of the initiating cause. 
 
• Dependability. The protection provided by the IPL reduces the identified risk by 
a known and specified amount. 
 







Fig. 2-4. FGS is like an IPL (Independent Protection Layer) (Kenexis, 2013). 
 
Fig. 2-5 is in essence a framework for the equations shown in Eq. 2-1. A graphical 
representation of safety sensor systems can help the project manager understand 
the dynamic risk posture as operational conditions change at filed sites. The need for 
additional sensors can be assessed or coverage (footprints) of sensors can be 
adjusted at compensate for an unacceptable risk level. Sensor-augmented risk 
management” systems can be implemented with concepts shown in Fig 2-4 and Fig 
2-5. More details will be discussed in chapter 4 and 5 when methodology and results 






Fig. 2-5. Modeling Risk in FGS engineering (Kenexis, 2013). 
From a risk and analysis equations 2-1 through 2-3 directly support Fig. 2-5 and help 





Eqs. 2-1 through 2-3. Risk equations for an FGS system (Kenexis, 2013). 
 
By using these equations and derivatives thereof (to be shown in Chapter 5), 
it is possible to model an FGS system in conjunction with sensors. More specifically, 
the model can lend some consideration to the accuracy and number of sensors 
required to reduce the residual risk.  
Sensor performance and coverage along with FGS effectiveness are of 
paramount importance to this model. Risk can be calculated by using risk integration 
Eq. 2-1      Fi*(F1+S1*F2) = Residual Risk (per year) 
Eq. 2-2      Fi*(S1*S2) = Mitigated Risk (per year) 




event tree summation. Obviously without the proper sensor in place, a particular risk 
modality would be overlooked and by definition result in a residual risk. For example, 
natural events such as lightning strikes are an understood risk; however, if a sensor 
system lacks detection of this phenomenon, then the risk cannot be countered. 
Better still, if a system had the ability to predict the likelihood of such an event then 
corrective measures can be taken. 
2.1.4 Lightning and the future of hydraulic fracturing  
As published by Romps, et al. in 2014 Science article, cloud-ground lightning 
strikes are predicted to increase by 50% during the 21st century due to global 
warming (Romps et al., 2014). As Fig. 2-8 clearly shows, cloud-ground lightning 
strikes as reported by the National Lightning Detection Network (NLDN) differ 





Fig. 2-6. Incidences of cloud-ground across the United States5 
 
According to a document on the NOAA Lightning Safety website6 Lightning is 
responsible for an average of 55-60 fatalities in the United States. 
  ■  Insurance losses exceed $1 billion annualy 
There are about 25 million cloud-ground lightning strikes in the U.S. each year7. 
 
 
The Lightning Safty site at NOAA continues to explain that injuries to people tend to 
follow occupations. Obviously people who work outside are at the greatest risk for 
lightning injury. The outlined occupations are considered to have the most exposure 
to lightning injury.  
• Logging 
• Explosive handling or storage 
• Heavy equipment operation 
• Plumbing and pipe fitting 
• Construction and building maintenance 
• Farming and field labor 










                                               
 
• Power utility field repair 
 
If Fig. 2-6 is superimposed upon the map of current and prospective shale plays (Fig. 
2-7), the importance of lightning in relation to fracking becomes apparent.  
 
Fig. 2-7. Current and prospective U.S. shale plays in 2015 based on the EIA8 
 
As was shown at the outset of this sub-section, global warming is predicted to cause 
a 50% increase in cloud-ground lightning incidences over this century (Romps et al., 
2014). Shale resourced hydrocarbons are expected to play an increasingly larger 
role in our energy economy for the foreseeable future.  In an interview with CNN on 





                                               
 
April 13th, 2015, Tom Kloza, Chief Oil Analyst at the Oil Price Information Service 
agrees with a forecast (Rystad Energy)9 for U.S. oil production to rise to a new 
record this year by saying they are "very reasonable." This will make the U.S. the 
third-largest crude oil producer, trailing only Saudi Arabia and Russia. If total 
hydrocarbon production is considered, the U.S. should keep its title as the world's 
top oil producer.10 By reviewing Fig. 2-8, the rapid growth in oil and gas production 
from U.S. hydro fracked shale plays becomes apparent.      
 
Fig. 2-8. U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Oil and Gas production11 
 
Cloud-ground lightning has been predicted to increase, while fracking for oil and gas 
is clearly on the assent. These intersecting factors alone should concern the 
operators of vulnerable hydrocarbon batteries; however, there is one additional 







                                               
 
clear that prospective fracking sites are located in substantial parts of the lightning 
prone Deep South. 
 
There is an obvious need for increased lightning “reediness” in the hydro 
fracking industry.  
 
 
Fig. 2-9. Overlay of lightning risk and shale play maps 
2.2 Research Questions to be Answered 
Fire and Gas Safety (FGS) systems are widely deployed in industrial 
environments (Association, 2004). The deployed atmospheric charge and tank 
charge sensors (to be detailed in Chapter 4) present IPL (Independent Protection 






1.) As fracking continues throughout the United States (and world), data is 
showing that the prevalence of lightning in fracking areas will increase 
dramatically.  Therefore the risk of an explosion – with accompanying financial 
and environmental consequences – is expected to increase dramatically as 
well.  Is there a way to use sensors and modeling to help minimize the financial 
and environmental losses and issues?  If so, could it be automated? 
 
In order to answer this fundamental question, a number of associated 
questions must be answered, including: 
 
2.) Develop the driving equations of the intersecting items, such as: 
• probability of lightning strikes,  
• cost of an environmental incident (pollutant dependent) 
• well production estimation (temporal dependent) 
• cost to incumbent organization for an incident (cost to fracking 
company) 
3.) What are the border implications for sensors and lightning detection 
beyond hydro fracking hydrocarbon storage? 
  
2.3   Implications of “an Answer” 
With research question 1, I will explore a pathway toward minimizing the 




of environmental impacts and risk costs prospective. The answers should provide a 
pathway toward automation of lightning mitigation systems.  
With question 2 answered, fundamental relationships will be realized and 
thus, the groundwork will be set for understanding how sensors systems with 
automated mitigation systems will impact the operation of hydro fracking sites. Also 
of interest is the touch points for these types of systems, and how can they be 
leveraged by the operations manager in the future. These fundamental questions are 
important for the design and validation of future such systems.  
 The implications of an answer to questions 3 will enable a lightning mitigation 
solution to find applications in large-scale hydrocarbon storage facilities.  
2.4 Summary 
This chapter detailed chemicals associated with the hydro fracking process for the 
purposed of understanding the problem space, and to gain an understanding 
pollution potential from tank accidents. The chapter then introduced the concept of 
an Independent Protection Layer (IPL) and its relation to automated safety systems. 
The chapter then introduce the lightning threat in the context of hydro fracking shale 






Chapter 3:  Literature Review and Related Activities 
 
This chapter discusses literature relating to hydro fracking tank composition 
and reviews a detailed assessment of tank accidents. In addition, tank storage 
standards are presented and conclusions related to unintended volatile contaminants 
are made toward the end of Section 3.1 Then, In section 3.2 a functional overview of 
sensors is provided within the context of the human sense of smell. In addition, 
thermal, chemical and optical sensors are discussed with applications. This is 
followed by the introduction of sensor touch points for hydro fracking. The chapter 
closes with a brief discussion of risk and decision trees. 
3.1 On-site Petroleum Storage and Safety 
In a 2002 paper drafted by Eckert (Eckert, 2004), regulation of petroleum 
storage tanks between 1983 and 1998 is studied with a view toward compliance. The 
paper opens by stating “In Canada and the United States it is common for 
environmental regulators to respond to a detected violation by issuing a warning 
rather than prosecuting the violator” (Eckert, 2004). So, if an agent faces no financial 
penalty from a violation, then violations will be common place (Polinsky).  
Despite this, the petroleum industry has taken tank safety seriously, and 
innovative designs have been patented for about 100 years thus far (Clifford, 1918). 
In this time frame, tank design was focused mostly on mechanical construction from 
various steel components (1927) and even to some extent the loss of product due to 
evaporation (Ivan, 1929). More importantly to this research, is the early interest 
(1916) in petroleum storage tank design related to the prevention of lightning initiated 




The fracking industry depends both steel and relatively cheap fiberglass 
storage tanks at the battery. From a practical prospective, fiberglass storage tanks 
for battery applications have become a common standard; due to their low relative 
cost and corrosion resistance (Eckert, 2004). As a highly cited paper by Chang et al. 
states; at 33% of storage tank accidents, lightning stands out as the #1 cause 
(Chang and Lin, 2006). Chang’s detailed paper explores 242 hydro carbon storage 
tank accidents over decades and complied table 3-1 below. Clearly, lightning stands 
out as the #1 cause of storage tank accidents. Table 3-1. General cause of hydro 
carbon storage tank accidents (Chang and Lin, 2006). 
 






The Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) under the United 
States Department of Labor indicates that fiberglass tanks are flammable, and are 
only suitable for storage of certain types of liquids in rural areas (United States 
Depatment of Labor - Occupational Saftey & Health Administration, 1993). Further, 
there use falls under the OSHA 1910.106(b)(1) standard if there use is relegated to 
underground instillations for many Classes of liquids (United States Depatment of 
Labor - Occupational Saftey & Health Administration, 1993). In particular, above 
ground fiberglass storage tanks shall not contain Class I, II or IIIA flammable liquids 
according to the cited OSHA standard (United States Depatment of Labor - 
Occupational Saftey & Health Administration, 1993). However, if the tank is assumed 
to be in a rural area and contain Class IIIB liquids such as crude oil, use is permitted 
in accordance with the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 30 (2015) 
standard (United States Depatment of Labor - Occupational Saftey & Health 
Administration, 1993), (National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)). 
NFPA 30 (2015) Class Examples 
Class IA Diethyl Ether, Ethylene Oxide, some 
light crude oils 
Class IB Motor and Aviation Gasolines, Toluene, 
Lacquers, Lacquer Thinner 
Class IC Xylene, some paints, some solvent‐
based cements 
Class II Diesel Fuel, Paint Thinner   
Class IIIA Home Heating Oil   
Class IIIB (OK for Fiberglass tanks) Cooking Oils, Lubricating Oils, Motor Oil   
Table 3-2. NFPA 30 (2015) Classes of Flammable and Combustible Liquids 
(National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)). 
 Following the recommended practices of NFPA 30 (2015), fiberglass tanks 
used at fracking site batteries are housed on the surface in rural areas, and from that 




shows, light crude oils and many other shorter chain and more volatile hydro carbons 
are not Class IIIB. In addition, any dissolved and degassing methane and ethane are 
also beyond the spirit of NFPA 30 (realizing they are gasses and NFPA 30 does not 
apply). None the less, these degassing short carbon chain have remarkably low 
flashpoints, and are extremely flammable (Haynes, 2013). This results in a situation 
where essentially any ignition source can easily trigger a fire or an explosion. In 
addition, the battery facility has a rudimentary separation column (shown in figure 3-
1) that is intended to mostly remove some volatile contaminants. Thus, the fiberglass 
tanks clearly hold more than just pure Class IIIB liquids. This mixture can directly 
exacerbate any tendency towards flammability of the storage tank. 
 




3.2   An Examination of Sensors Applicable for Use In and 
Around Hydraulic Fracturing Storage Batteries 
3.2.1 Sensors  
A block diagram of a generic sensor system is shown in Fig. 3-2, where Grundler has 
taken the approach of sensors paralleling the functionality of a living organism, 
prescribed here in its simplest form  (Gründler, 2007).  
 
Figure 3-2. Basic anatomy of a sensor – adapted from (Gründler, 2007). 
  
3.2.2 The transducer 
The transducer is the “gateway” of a sensor, it connects the sensor to the 
outside world  (see Figure 3-2); it functions by converting one form of energy into 
another (for our purposes electrical signals) (Agarwal and Lang, 2005). The 
transduction device simply transforms signals from the sensor into output ready for 





Fig. 3-3. Human Machine Interface (HMI) – Rooke 2014 
The HMI (Fig. 3-3) is an example of a “Higher Level System” as shown in Fig 
3-2. This particular HMI is operational in a “blender” in preparation for fracturing 
operations. At this interface, a technician can modify the mixture in accordance with 
best practices and standards (Halliburton, 2013).   
3.2.3 Thermal Imaging and Physical sensors 
Physical sensors represent a broad class of sensors that measure physical 
phenomena not limited to: vibration, heat, shock, acceleration, acoustic, and 
pressure. As a relevant example, Crippa et al. (Crippa et al., 2009) presents the 
cost/benefit relationship of a fire risk assessment methodology with a decision tree 
(event tree), and Infrared imaging. Crippa explains that the first step is to establish a 
realistic level of risk with a particular facility without risk reduction measures in place. 
Then quantifying the potential for risk reduction that can be realized with a single or 
multiple risk mitigation measures.  
3.2.4 Chemical sensors 
One chemical sensor that is always present is your nose. In more scientific 




basic level olfactory transduction (recall transducer discussion in 3.2.1) is triggered 
by the binding of odorant molecules to receptors located on the cilia on the surface of 
specialized olfactory cells (Cagan, 2012; Getchell, 1986). Actions occur on a 
microscopic scale since olfactory cilia are around 0.25 µm in diameter (Nakamura 
and Gold, 1987).  Recognition of a certain odor is the result of a concert of sensory 
cells each reporting only a facet of the odor (Lancet, 1986).  
This information is transmitted to a region of the forebrain known as the olfactory 
bulb where “date fusion” takes place, and a vertebrate animal is able to distinguish a 
particular odor (this is analogous to the microprocessor and computation blocks in 
Figure 3-2) (Shepherd and Greer, 1998). 
By referring to Fig. 3-2 and 3-4 one can see how the olfactory system like any 
sensor system encodes stimuli (in this case chemical odors) and transduces and 
transmits this information to higher order centers (as in Fig. 3-2). At present, little is 
known about the central organization of the olfactory system; in particular, somatic 
sensory and visual cortices leverage special maps whereas the olfactory bulb 
transmits signals to higher centers (cerebral cortex) that uses an unknown 
















Fig. 3-5. Olfactory systems oriented view (Purves D, 2001). 
 
Indeed, the olfactory sensor system is complicated; yet on the most fundamental 
level, it parallels manmade sensor systems of almost any kind (refer to Fig. 3-5 and 
Fig. 3-2).  
As we step away from the exclusive world of smell; it can be said that 
chemical sensors represent a class of devices that provide information concerning 
the chemical species present in a measurement environment that is typically in the 
liquid or gas phase (Banica, 2012). However, some chemical sensors including 
corrosion sensors can function within solid boundaries and even leverage the power 
of wireless technology to transmit information (Andringa et al., 2005). So, chemical 
sensors run the gamut when it comes to sensing: solid, liquid, and gas. 
As we bring our literature research back to the topic at hand, hydro fracking 




phenomenon. Chemical species in the atmosphere surrounding hydro fracking 
facilities has been of interest to researchers 
3.2.5 Fiber Optic Sensors 
The discipline of fiber optics is a detailed field, and much of it is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. However, a brief overview of the optical fiber from a 
general prospective shall now be presented. The speed of light is dependent upon 
the medium of its travel; this helps define the concept of refractive index and its 
origins date back to the time of Newton (Lipson et al., 2010). Refractive index or 
index of refraction “n” describes how radiation or light travels through a material and 
shown in equation 3-1  (Hecht, 2002). In this equation, n is the refractive index of the 
material, c is the speed of light in a vacuum and υ is the phase velocity of light in the 
chosen medium (Hecht, 2002). 




Equation 3-1. Refractive index or index or refraction 
 
With the concept of refractive index having been presented, the concept of 
Snell’s Law can be explored. Snell’s Law was presented in literature by Willebrord 
Snell in 1621; while others including Thomas Hariot, Walter Warner, and Sir Thomas 
Aylesbury were independently working on the same physical phenomena, Snell is 
historically credited with the discovery (Shirley, 1951). Before we present Snell’s 
Law, a companion concept is the critical angle. In simple terms, if we have two 
materials with varying refractive indices, the critical angle is the angle which anything 




𝑝𝑝1 sin𝜃𝜃1 =  𝑝𝑝2 sin𝜃𝜃2 
Equation 3-2. Snell’s Law 
 
An illustration of Snell’s law, critical angle, and total internal reflection is 
shown in Figure 3-6 where n1 represents the center of an optical fiber (core) and n2 
represents the cladding of a fiber.  
 
Figure 3-6. Optical fiber and basic concepts  
 
As a sub-class of sensors that span both physical and chemical sensors we 
have the fiber optic sensor. This type of sensor plays a significant role in the oil and 
gas arena and due to ability to sense passively without endpoint electronics is 
particularly useful for the hostile downhole environment. As an example, 
Schlumberger Limited has developed fiber optic sensors for downhole temperature 
pressure measurements for application in oil wells with possible applications in gas 
wells. This technology known as a Distributed Temperature Systems takes 
advantage of fact that fiber optic sensors often have what amounts to the equivalent 




3-7) can be a key component of a modern distributed fiber optic sensor system (Hill 
and Meltz, 1997), (Kersey and Berkoff, 1992).  
In short, a Bragg grating is a fabricated periodic pattern of differing indices of 
refraction to create a desired effect; sometimes holographic methods are used to 
impose this pattern (Meltz et al., 1989) (Fig. 3-8). The Bragg grating is capable of 
measuring: vibrational, temperature, and pressure information which is relayed in 
real-time along the entire depth of the production well. This enables the 
measurement of reservoir performance, and to help judge well completion integrity. 
Many of these types of sensors use Bragg grating technology the can even function 
simultaneously as a temperature and pressure sensor as explained in research by 
Annamdas (Annamdas and Annamdas, 2010).  
 





Fig. 3-8. Fiber optic Bragg grating – “burning” a pattern 
 
A specific implementation of Bragg technology was studied by Keul et al. 
(Keul et al., 2005) and again by Hornby et al. (Hornby et al., 2005). These studies 
deployed permeant “in-well” fiber optic sensors capable of measuring microseismic 
events which proved useful for understanding reservoir behavior when contrasted 
with surface seismic readings (Keul et al., 2005), (Hornby et al., 2005). Before this 
technology was tested by Keul et al., other fiber optic seismic sensor systems 
(lacking Bragg technology) proved to be bulky, and unfit for “in-well” deployment 
(Gardner and Garrett, 1988). 
3.2.6 Hydrologic Fracturing Sensor Touchpoints 
Hydrologic fracturing operations offer a significant opportunity for smart 
sensor technology. The fracking process is many decades old and thus, from a 




sensors can align with fracking operations, we now highlight the various categories 
of sensors for surface hydro fracking operations   
 
• Well and Drilling Sensors 
• Surface activity sensors 
• Asset tracking 
• Atmospheric Sensors 
• Aquatic Sensors  
• Seismic and Ground Condition Sensors 
 
Well and Drilling Sensors are used to monitor the progress of well completion. They 
are considered to be “down hole” sensors that must in some cases survive unique 
conditions as well as limitations of RF (wireless) underground. Some explorations 
companies use fiber optics as both the sensor and the physical medium for 
transmitting telemetry information 
 
Surface Activity and Storage Sensors in the hydro fracking arena should focus on the 
movement of equipment and movement of fracking vehicles such as water trucks. 
How does all this movement impact the environment through accelerated erosion 
and noise? In addition, this project has deployed EM Field sensors on the battery 
where produced hydrocarbons are stored and susceptible to lightning strikes and 
charge buildup resulting in fires.  
 
Asset Tracking and automation with sensors is a critical area for project 




companies fail to use automated site asset tracking with sensor systems. By 
leveraging such a system, equipment and supplies could be tagged with low-cost 
RFID tags. By using a system with multiple readers and landmark references (fixed 
know RFID points) in combination with Probabilistic Kalman Filtering, precision and 
accuracy can be achieved to within centimeters in 3 dimensions (Bekkali et al., 2007; 
Nazari Shirehjini and Shirmohammadi, 2009). The benefits of such a sensor system 
to the owner operator of hydro fracking sites will discussed in chapter 5. 
 
Atmospheric Sensors are of particular importance to PXD and a case study of such 
sensors along with results will be presented in subsequent chapter 4. DAQFactory a 
controls and simulation environment in combination with the Python scripting 
language is used to show decision tree algorithm enabled sensors in action. PXD 
currently has lightning sensors deployed at the battery that were part of this research 
project.   
 
Aquatic Sensors can be used to monitor both underground water sources including 
both wells and aquifers. In addition, holding ponds and water discharged directly into 
waterways can also be measured for radioactivity and chemical concentration.  
 
Seismic and Ground Condition Sensors can be used to show the relationship 
between hydro fracking activities and seismic activity adjacent to hydro fracking 
sites. Several scholarly studies and even the hydro fracking industry itself has shown 






3.3   Examples of Prior Activities in Risk and Optimization at 
Fracking Batteries 
3.3.1 Risk  
The Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) describes risk in this 
way: ‘An uncertain event or condition, that if it occurs, has a positive or negative 
effect on a project’s objective.’ (Institute, 2008) The focus here is on the term 
uncertain event; it is unknown if this event will or won’t happen, and maybe even 
when it could happen. With this said, a project manager is only concerned with 
events that will impact the project. (Weaver, 2008)  
 In order to gain a foundational understanding of risk, it is critical to 
understand two hand-in-glove pairs of terms: uncertainty vs. variability along with 
accuracy vs. precision. In particular, uncertainty refers to a situation that might occur, 
where variability is an inherent in almost every project or process. The goal is to 
minimize unexplained variability to achieve acceptable outcomes (Weaver, 2008). 
Precision refers to the repeatability of a process while accuracy refers to the degree 
of “correctness” of a process. You must have both precision and accuracy to shoot 
consistent 3-point shots in basketball. 
3.3.2 Decision Trees 
Given certain conditions or parameters, a sensor system will be able to make 
decisions to for instance: open or close valves, turn on or off pumps, sound alarms, 
or simply cease an operation. While decision trees are part of this dissertation, they 
are by no means the focus of this research. Rather, decision trees are one of many 




interplay with decision trees and the implementation of IPLs. Should mitigation be 
activated or not?  
 
 
Figure 3-8. Example Decision Tree 
 
3.4 Summary 
Fiberglass hydrocarbon storage tanks are ubiquitous in the fracking industry; 
they are relatively cheap and unfortunately flammable. Sensors can play critical role 
in mitigating the impacts from lightning strikes on hydrocarbon storage tanks. The 
diversity of sensors coupled with the presented touch points for hydro fracking 







Chapter 4:  Research Methodology 
 
First, we review the research questions presented in Chapter 2, cite their 
importance and present a methodology to discover answers to these research 
questions. Some fundamental questions to have in mind are: why are methodologies 
used by others on similar problems relevant to our problem? Did others have flaws in 
their methodologies? What makes our approach valid?  
4.1 Appropriate Methodology for Addressing the Research 
Questions 
In sections 2.2 and 2.3 we presented research questions and also presented 
implications for the industry if sound answers are discovered. In section 2.2 we 
presented the research questions as re-written here: 
 
1.) As fracking continues throughout the United States (and world), data is showing 
that the prevalence of lightning in fracking areas will increase dramatically.  
Therefore the risk of an explosion – with accompanying financial and environmental 
consequences – is expected to increase dramatically as well.  Is there a way to use 
sensors and modeling to help minimize the financial and environmental losses and 
issues?  If so, could it be automated? 
 
In order to answer this fundamental question, a number of associated questions 
must be answered, including: 
 




• probability of lightning strikes,  
• cost of an environmental incident (pollutant dependent) 
• well production estimation (temporal dependent) 
• cost to incumbent organization for an incident (cost to fracking company) 
3.) What are the border implications for sensors and lightning detection beyond 
hydro fracking hydrocarbon storage? 
 
Let us now consider the following to aid our analysis:  
o Are methodologies used by others on similar problems relevant to our 
problem?  
o Did others have flaws in their methodologies?  
o What makes our approach valid? 
4.1.1 Relevant methodologies used by others 
The problem of lightning in open-air industrial settings is a well-known 
problem (Chang and Lin, 2006). Operation supervisors at these sites resort to 
weather forecasts and rules of thumb to change operational posture or even suspend 
operations. For purposes of insurance and indemnification, most operators use 
NOAA lightning guidelines12.  
The onsite managers are often burdened with the responsibility of making a 
real-time decision with financial considerations such as: equipment might be lost, 





                                               
 
Often SOPs implement broad OPCONs (Operational Condition) that may not 
account for all risk or consequences in real-time operations. 
Before the particular methodologies used by others is presented, the 
concepts of Time of Arrival (TOA) and Time of Group Arrival (TOGA) shall be 
discussed.  TOA is sometimes called Time of Flight (TOF); as such this is the 
amount of time it takes for a signal to travel from the transmitter (source) to the 
receiver (detector). As an expansion on TOA, TOGA is the fusion of more than one 
TOA contribution to produce more enriched and accurate data; geolocation is more 
precise as a general consequence.   
An organization called Blitzortung has developed a community-based 
platform for Time-of-Arrival lightning detection. Unassembled sensors kits for 







Fig. 4-1. Community-based platform for Time-of-Arrival lightning detection 
 
This project is setting out to form a low-cost solution to world-wide location 
solutions. The accuracy and precision (see Fig 5-16), is based on the spacing of 
each station; typically 50 – 250 Km. Sensors detect lightning strikes, then transmit 
the occurrence of an electromagnetic pulse to central servers for information fusion. 
However any data supplied to the project can only be used for non-commercial 
purposes. Furthermore, since these are kits, Blitzortung says that any modifications 
to the kit including the amplifier will invalidate you contribution to the community TOA 
calculations. In addition, the kit is susceptible to any electromagnetic interference 
from: power supplies, computers, fluorescent lamps, and Televisions. In some cases 
Blitzortung says that this has resulted in invalid data being transmitted. The 
information from one station is not enough to compute the position of a lightning 
strike; a minimum of 4 stations is required (Wanke, 2014).  
 Another organization called the World Wide Lightning Location Network 
(WWLLN) determines the location of lightning events around the globe in real-time   
with a focus on stroke power (Hutchins et al., 2012). This system operates with 1 km 
errors for location information and has detection efficiency of >90%; in addition, the 
system can provide an estimation discharge amplitude and polarity (Jacobson et al., 
2006). The system detects VLF electromagnetic radiation and leverages TOA and 




The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) takes a 
different approach to detecting lightning strikes13. In cooperation with the U.S. Air 
Force 14th Weather Squadron located in Ashville, NC. Through this squadron, the Air 
Force works with the United States National Climatic Data Center (NCDC)14; a 
branch of NOAA. Currently, cloud-to-ground and intra-cloud lightning flashes are 
detected by a network of 100 ground stations across the country. The flashes are 
mapped in real-time by the National Lightning Detection Network (NLDN) developed 
by the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology (NMIMT). Users have access 
to real-time data (Government or Military only) and the public has access to 
processed data of over 160 Million flashes since 1986 (raw data is not available for 
public or commercial use)15 The same NSSL site (as footnoted below) discussed an 
experimental satellite that observes flashes in tropical regions, but is unable to 
differentiate between cloud-cloud and cloud-ground lightning.     
4.1.2 Flaws in methodologies used by others 
As outlined in section 4.1.1, there are 2 primary methodologies used by 
others for the detection of lightning events. They were VLF (Radio Frequency) 
signals and TOA techniques, and ground based photonic detectors. Both of these 
general techniques are not predictive in nature; they are observing past events. In 










                                               
 
will permit the real-time sharing of raw data for commercial or public consumption.  
While some of these systems as described had detection accuracies of 1 Km and 
efficiencies of >90%, without real-time access to raw data, this is little use to the 
industrial practitioner or automated system in assessing lightening risk hear and 
now.  
4.1.3 Deployed methodology - Lightning Anticipation Technology  
By deploying a system that detects atmospheric charge buildup, the test 
system is able to predict a lightning strike. Lightning is caused by electrical charge 
separation in the atmosphere. The intensity of this charge separation can be 
determined by measuring the electric field, which is accomplished with an Electric 
Field Meter (EFM) Thus, monitoring of the electric field can warn people of a 
potentially dangerous situation, before the first lightning occurs. Following is a 
description of the process. 
On a clear day, when the atmosphere is clear of storm clouds, the primary 
source of electric charge creating an electric field on the surface of the earth is the 
ionosphere. This can be thought of as a large dome-shaped electrode high above 
the earth, which produces positive charges which contrast to the relatively negatively 
charged earth. This scenario creates what is termed a "fair weather" electric field due 
to the positive charge overhead. When this "fair" field is measured by the EFM, it can 
be seen to produce an output of from 50 to about 200 Volts per meter ("V/m"). This 
value varies, depending upon conditions in the atmosphere, and is also altered by 
"local effects". Such effects are caused by anything which can carry electrical 




etc. Usually, though, the field stays between -50 and -200 V/m during fair or non-
stormy weather. 
When thunderclouds form, however, processes within their vicinity cause the 
formation of negative electric charges (the opposite of the ionosphere) at the cloud 
base. As the charge builds, it creates a "foul weather" electric field which grows and 
then begins to cancel out the "fair weather" field. As it builds further, it becomes 
many times greater than the fair weather field. It is this "foul weather" electric field 
which intensifies to the point that the air can no longer insulate the opposite charges. 
Finally, the positive and negative charges are drawn together suddenly via any 
convenient "weak spot" which occurs in the atmosphere. This is the energetic 
discharge we call lightning. 
Foul weather electric fields can reach values of well over 10,000 volts per 
meter at the ground during a storm. 
It is the separation of positive and negative electric charges into large groups 
which creates the lightning hazard. These groups, of opposite polarity, are naturally 
attracted to each other but held apart by the atmosphere's insulating properties. As 
these groups grow during the formation of a storm, the force of their attraction can 
exceed the atmosphere's ability to keep them separated. Lightning is the sudden, 
intense electrical recombination of these groups which occurs when this point is 
reached. The local electric field varies in proportion to the strength of these groups 
and their distance from the measuring device, so its measurement gives an idea as 
to the likelihood of lightning occurring. A strong electric field indicates that the 
situation is conducive to the formation of lightning. 
This is an over-simplified explanation of what is actually a very complex 




role in determining the likelihood of lightning occurring in a particular area of the 
earth. 
Military (U.S. Navy NAVSEA) and other government agencies (NOAA) have 
determined that electric fields above 2000 Volts per meter create the greatest 
lightning threat. Many operations centers have requirements to cease and secure 
certain operations when the electric field reaches this number in an effort to reduce 
damage or injuries caused by lightning. A high electric field reading does not ensure 
that lightning will occur, but only that conditions are conducive to its occurring. 
Experiments have shown that due to the relatively large size of 
thunderclouds, the electric field does not show tremendous variation over short 
distances. If the electric field has reached a value of 2000 Volts per meter at one 
location (a dangerous level), it will be reasonable to assume that the level is 
dangerous for several miles, at least, in any direction. Likewise, if the level is below 
500 Volts per meter (a relatively non-hazardous level), it can be assumed that the 
hazard is low for at least several miles. 
Although predicting an actual lightning strike is difficult if not impossible no 
matter what technique is used, monitoring the local electric field along with some 
interpretation and experience can be one of the best ways to determine how likely it 
is for lightning to strike an area. 
The electric field variations during a typical thunderstorm are shown in Figure 
1. Before 2240 hours, the field is low and positive (fair weather polarity), but small 
"bumps" indicate distant lightning. The local threat is probably still low at this time. At 
2240, the field "crosses zero", and begins to climb. This is when one should prepare 
to take cover. Around 2250 the field exceeds 2kV/m, and the threat should be 




present, particularly if the buildup is directly overhead and lightning has not yet 
begun. What is important here is the average level of the field. 
 
Figure 4-2.  Electric field measurements during a typical lightning storm (from 
Mission Instruments). 
 
As a storm builds, the physical arrangement of the charged bodies (clouds) 
combined with the various effects they have on the local atmosphere can create a 
variety of electric field build-up patterns. Also, when lightning strikes, either between 
the cloud charge pockets or between these pockets and the earth, it will cause a 
large change in the electric field as seen by a EFM. These changes, often fast-
occurring and short-lived, can take the field back and forth between fair and foul 
polarities many times during a storm as can be seen between 2300 and 2330. No 




although a significant threat still exists. Lightning often does typically occur during 
this phase of the storm.  
 
4.2 Instrumentation and Communications for In-Field Research 
Large scale hydraulic fracturing sites with inherent exposure to potentially 
catastrophic events, lack sensor integration with decision algorithms. This is 
particularly true for catastrophic atmospheric events such as charge induction, and 
direct lightning strikes. 
Field instruments supply raw data that must be analyzed in the context of risk 
in order to make informed project decisions at a particular site. By using equations 
presented in Chapter 2 and 3 for application in Chapter 5 I will lay the ground work 
for an analytic tool that will provide planners and managers with unique insight into 
the lightning threat and their operations.   
 
4.3   Unique attributes of the Field Test Location 
Large scale industrial operations will be the immediate beneficiaries of this 
research. As such, the chosen facility was hosted by Pioneer Natural Resources 
(PXD) at a functioning hydro fracking site. The specific site will be outline in greater 
detail in Chapter 5. For relevance to this section, the specific reason for choosing this 
particular battery for our test site involved access and general logistics. The chosen 
site has easy access from a main access road and houses the right kind of battery 
tanks for my tests (fiberglass tanks). Realizing that producing meaningful results will 
require a diversity of tanks.  
 





Fig. 4-3. DAQFactory model and control interface 
 
Given enough detailed information about the system of systems that 
comprises the hydro fracking operation, a complete model and interface can be 
developed (Fig. 4-3). However, this is a multi-million dollar effort that will require 
years of onsite proprietary access to PXD operations and equipment across diverse 
sites. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, very important foundational steps can be 
taken toward providing value to hydro fracking operations. By using basic simulation 
tools such as Monte Carlo, the threat of lightning and a potential mitigation strategy 





4.5   Operational system for lightning and charge situational awareness  
As was explained in section 4.1.3, this research project deployed an 
atmospheric charge solution for lightning detection. To reiterate, this technology 
differs greatly from the VHF (Radio Frequency) and photonic detectors used by 
others including NOAA as outlined in section 4.1. 
 
 
Fig. 4-4. Campbell Scientific (CS110) Electric Field Meter 
By deploying a proven electric field meter designed by Campbell Scientific 
(CS110), for the application of measuring atmospheric charge to predict lightning 
strikes, performance variables can be minimized. Since the CS110 sensor system is 
a proven technology, performance has been benchmarked by various organizations 
including NAVSEA (U.S. Navy), NASA, and NOAA.  
 These organizations have developed thresholds for lightning warning hazards  




charge reading on the CS110 ABS (1000 V/m) to represent a hazard within its 
Launch Pad Lightening Warning System (LPLWS). The U.S. Navy takes a more 
conservative approach and considers a charge reading on the CS110 above ABS 
(2000 V/m)16   
 
Fig. 4-4. Electric Field vs. time during an electromagnetic storm (CS110) 
 
In addition to Electric Field monitoring by the CS110, a custom built solution 
was deployed to monitor the electrostatic buildup on fiberglass tanks as this has 
been shown to be a pathway for tanks fires by other researchers (Chang and Lin, 
2006). Thus, monitoring the static charge buildup on fiberglass tanks is a facet of our 
approach to answer the research questions outlined in chapter 2 and again at the 
outset of this chapter. 
16 ABS in this case represents absolute value. Obviously, the smaller the number, the 
easer a system may trigger an alarm. 
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The deployed tank charge monitoring solution will be described at length in 
Chapter 5, however here we highlight its value as a methodology toward answering 
our research objectives. By measuring the electrical charge buildup and non-
conductive fiberglass tanks, there exists another modality for evaluating the potential 
for electrical discharge; in this case on a much smaller scale than a direct lightning 
strike namely, static discharge. The results can be similar as a static discharge cans 
till trigger a fire or in some cases depending on volatile contaminants, and explosion 
(see Table 3-2). Produced hydrocarbons and are known to be a mix of many 
components and therefore do not only exhibit the moderate volatility associate with 
crude oil. 
 
4.6   Data Acquisition via Remote Telemetry – Data Fusion 
 In order to transform data into intelligence, it must be fused with other 
parameters including tank charge sensors and even humidity conditions in the 
atmosphere. Intelligence is a product of data fusion and is the basis upon which an 
operator or planner can take action.  
 Data fusion can be loosely defined as the exploitation of information from 
multiple data sources (sensors) to estimate or infer a set of desired attributes about a 
set of target entities (Hall and Llinas, 1997).  The sensors can be similar in nature 
(e.g., temperature sensors) or quite diverse (i.e., multi-modal), such as a 
combination of temperature sensors, pressure sensors, humidity sensors, cameras, 
etc.  Data collected usually overlap in time and/or space, or are complementary in 
nature.  A natural question to ask is why anyone should care about such fusion of 




following advantages over a single data source scenario:  1) wider spatial/temporal 
coverage, 2) improved robustness/fault tolerance, and 3) improved estimation of 
relevant information from raw data. Fig. 4-5 illustrates the basic idea of fusing data 
from multiple sensors.   
 
Fig. 4-5. A Sensor Fusion Scenario Inside a Building 
 The figure portrays a scenario of a typical office space with a hallway and 
multiple rooms on each side.  Four different sensors are mounted on the ceiling in 
each room:  1) a carbon-dioxide sensor, 2) an acoustic sensor, 3) an infrared sensor, 
and 4) a visible camera.  Data from each of these sensors in each room are 
combined by a data fusion node shown mounted in the ceiling over the hallway.  This 
node combines the data from all the sensors and produces high-level knowledge 
about this space that can be used to automatically control the indoor environment or 
by a building manager to assess the operational efficiency of the lightning system 




4.6.1 Wider Spatial/Temporal Coverage 
Wider coverage is obtained by aggregating data from individual sensors with 
each sensor having a relatively limited coverage.  For example, suppose a building is 
monitored through security cameras which are the data sources in this case.  One 
camera may be able to only see the main entrance area but not the rest of the 
building.  So, with this camera alone, one would not have any information about the 
status of the other areas in the building.  However, if a second camera is placed on 
the opposite corner and the data from both the cameras are combined, one can now 
monitor the entrance area as well as the opposite end of the building.  Adding more 
cameras will provide surveillance coverage for more and more areas by aggregating 
or fusing the data from each camera.  Thus, fusion of data from multiple sensors can 
provide wider spatial coverage.  The same can be true in terms of temporal coverage 
as well.  A visible camera may only work during the day when there is adequate light 
available, but will likely not work at night when the building is dark.  If an infrared 
camera with the ability to see during the night is also deployed, data from these two 
types of cameras can be combined to gain wider temporal coverage.  Such spatial 
and temporal monitoring without a coverage gap is critical in many applications, and 
data fusion is a key enabler behind such capabilities. 
4.6.2 Better Robustness/Fault Tolerance 
Having more than one source of data (i.e., redundant sources) can provide 
better robustness or fault tolerance.  If a small subset of the sensors happens to fail 
or malfunction, the data from the other sensors can fill the gap and maintain the flow 
of critical data.  Care needs to be taken, however, to differentiate data streams 




sensors.  Otherwise, completely inappropriate decisions may be made in a given 
situation. To help identify this, simple and often effective technique is a consensus-
based approach in which the majority of compatible data are assumed to be the 
standard and any disagreements from this standard are assumed to be problematic.  
The underlying assumption is that failures are rare and that most of the sensors are 
not faulty.   
4.6.3 Better Estimation of Information from Data 
Having a multitude of sensors measuring raw target parameters creates the 
possibility of inferring a much higher level of information about the target than is 
usually possible with a single sensor.  However, it is important that raw data from 
multiple sensors are not highly correlated.  The more diverse the data, the better the 
estimation will be. 
For example, suppose we are trying to extract the three-dimensional shape of 
an object from three different cameras.  If one camera each is dedicated to capturing 
the front view, the rear view, and the top view, then combining the images from all 
three cameras can provide a fairly decent idea about the shape of the object.  This is 
because the images from the three cameras were taken from three very different 
viewpoints and hence they were diverse or fairly uncorrelated.  However, if all three 
cameras are placed near each other in front of the object, there is no good way to 
infer the shape at the top or the back side of the object.  In this case, the data from 
the multiple sensors (cameras) are very similar and not diverse enough to provide 
more inference than can be determined from a single sensor.  Such data are said to 




significantly uncorrelated, then data fusion across those sensors can greatly improve 
estimates of the target’s attributes of interest.   
Various research efforts have shown how using data fusion helps improve 
estimating target parameters.  For example, Strelow et al. (Strelow and Singh, 2002) 
fused optical, as well as inertial parameters, then measurements were used to obtain 
optimal motion estimates of targets.  Also, research by Veth et al. (Veth and Raquet, 
2007) has demonstrated the value of integrating optical and inertial measurement 
units for navigation.   
4.6.4 Technical Details 
Sensor fusion can be broadly classified into two categories:  1) homogeneous 
and 2) heterogeneous.  In the first case, the sensors that produce data to be fused 
are identical in terms of sensing capabilities and output properties, whereas in the 
second case, the system consists of diverse kinds of sensors, such as acoustic 
sensors, imaging sensors, temperature sensors, pressure sensors, etc.  In general, 
fusion across a set of homogeneous sensors is easier than fusion of data from 
heterogeneous sensors, primarily because data alignment, one of the most 
fundamental steps in data fusion, which is easier in the case of homogeneous 
sensors.   
The data fusion process can also be categorized into three broad classes based on 
the amount of pre-processing done on the raw data before fusing them:  1) low-level 




4.6.5 Low-Level Fusion 
 In low-level fusion, raw data from the sensors are fed to the fusion engine 
with minimal pre-processing and the engine extracts all high-level information.  The 
volume of data transferred between a data source and the fusion node is relatively 
high because the sensors can collect quite a large volume of raw data to be fused.  
This may make this paradigm infeasible where the communication bandwidth is low 
Fig. 4-6, illustrates this fusion paradigm.   
 
Fig. 4-6.  Low-Level Data Fusion Scheme 
4.6.6 Feature-Level Fusion 
 This scenario can be thought of as an intermediate-level data fusion scheme.  
Each sensor platform has sufficient computational capability to identify interesting 
properties corresponding to the desired targets and extract a set of relevant features 
to be input to the fusion engine.  It then extracts high-level information by combining 
these features from the individual sensors; Fig. 4-7 illustrates this fusion paradigm.  
The paradigm is based on the assumption that it is possible to identify and segment 
the targets in each sensor data on its own without any input from any other sensor.  




of the raw sensor data.  Because the only data transferred between a sensor node 
and the fusion engine are the extracted features, the communication bandwidth 
required under this fusion scheme is significantly less than what is required in the 
case of low-level fusion. 
 
Fig. 4-7. Feature-Level Fusion Scheme 
4.6.7 Decision-Level Fusion 
 In this case, each of the data sources have sufficient onboard computing 
capability to process the raw sensor data to generate higher-level information with a 
more compact representation than the raw data.  It is this higher-level information 
that the sensor nodes feed to the fusion engine.  As a result the communication 
bandwidth requirements are more modest than in the case of low-level fusion. Fig. 4-





Fig. 4-8. Decision-Level Fusion Scheme 
 As an example, suppose one wanted to count the number of people in a 
building where each office is equipped with a camera to capture images at pre-
defined time intervals.  For this scenario, assume that image processing algorithms 
have been developed to extract the number of people that appear in a captured 
image.  In a low-level fusion scenario, the camera in each room will send the raw 
image pixel data to a fusion engine which will then process each image to find the 
number of people in each office, and subsequently add the numbers from each office 
to report the total number of people in all the offices combined.  Because each 
camera transmits the raw image, the bandwidth requirement is quite high. 
 In the case of feature-level fusion, each sensor may analyze its image to 
determine the segments that show change from a reference image, such as an 
empty room.  Then the changes would likely correspond to human occupants.  
However, a change may also correspond to an item in the room that has been 
moved since the reference image was captured, such as a chair.  The sensor in this 
paradigm does not differentiate humans from non-humans.  It simply identifies the 
image segments corresponding to such changes and extracts relevant features, such 




these features to the fusion node which combines them to produce the high-level 
knowledge about the environment. 
 In contrast, with a high-level fusion scenario, each camera system will locally 
run all the algorithms necessary to extract the accurate count of people in the 
respective room by fully analyzing the captured raw image and only send this 
number (a single integer) to the fusion engine, which will add up the numbers sent by 
each camera to output the final result. Obviously, the bandwidth requirement in this 
case for the transfer of high-level information (a single number) by each sensor to 
the fusion engine is significantly lower than that in the previous cases where the 
whole image or the features had to be transferred.  But this reduction in bandwidth 
comes at the expense of each camera system requiring enough computational 
power to perform complete image analysis. 
4.6.8 Distributed versus Centralized Fusion 
 Traditionally, a centralized architecture has been common in data-fusion 
systems.  In such a system, there is a single fusion processing node, and all the 
sensors send their data to this node.  The fusion node is responsible for all aspects 
of data merging and extraction of high level information; Fig. 4-9. illustrates a 
centralized fusion system (Esteban et al., 2005).  This approach is algorithmically 
simple to implement but requires significant communication bandwidth because 
every sensor needs to send the entire output to the fusion node.  A major drawback 
of this approach is its susceptibility to a single point of failure.  If the fusion node fails, 





Fig. 4-9. Centralized Fusion Architecture 
 However, a data-fusion system does not necessarily need to have a 
centralized architecture.  The fusion task can be performed in a distributed manner.  
An incremental step toward distributed fusion from a centralized framework is an 
architecture in which the overall fusion task can be divided into smaller subtasks that 
are performed by separate fusion sub-engines.  The output of each of these sub-
engines can then be merged at a master fusion node to produce the final fused 
output.  This is a bi-level hierarchical fusion architecture.  The obvious generalization 
is a multi-level hierarchy.  Hierarchical fusion architectures can be broadly classified 
into two categories—one with feedback and the other without feedback among the 
fusion nodes. Fig. 4-10 illustrates the concept of hierarchical fusion.  Error! 
Reference source not found. 4-10(a) shows an architecture without feedback, and 





Fig. 4-10. Hierarchical Data-Fusion Architectures 
 There are several advantages to hierarchical data-fusion schemes 
(Varshney, 1997).  It requires significantly less communication bandwidth because a 
low-level fusion node receives data from a smaller number of sensor nodes 
compared to the case of centralized fusion.  Plus, the data volume transferred 
between any two fusion nodes is significantly smaller than the raw sensor data size 
because the fusion nodes usually transfer aggregated information at a higher level of 
information abstraction with a more compact representation than raw sensor output.  
In addition, each fusion node requires smaller computational capacity because the 
computational tasks are distributed across multiple fusion nodes.  These also do not 
have any single point of catastrophic failure and, hence, are more resilient.   
 The extreme case of a distributed and decentralized data fusion framework is 
one in which there are no designated fusion engines but a network of sensors, as a 




computational frameworks are known as “swarm” algorithms (Yiyue et al., 2012).  
Such systems are more robust and fault tolerant than centralized or semi-centralized 
architectures because the swarms are robust against the failure of a subset of 
nodes.  There is no predefined communication hierarchy or topology and the network 
is capable of autonomously reconfiguring its communication pathways if a set of 
nodes happen to fail.  Also, adding new nodes into the system is seamless.  This 
makes this type of architecture highly scalable.   
 Despite these advantages, the distributed and decentralized fusion 
architectures pose a number of challenges.  In the hierarchical scheme, it is not 
trivial to design an optimal architecture, such as defining the assignment of sensor 
subsets to first-level fusion nodes and the communication topology for the fusion 
nodes.  Also, one cannot take a centralized fusion algorithm and apply it in a 
hierarchical fusion system.  The algorithms need to be tailored to the architecture, 
which is not an easy task.  Designing a swarm-based algorithm for data fusion is 
likely the most complex of all the decentralized fusion schemes.  This has led to 
research to address these challenges (Moses et al., 2006; Chair and Varshney, 
1986; Durrant-Whyte et al., 1990; Julier and Uhlmann, 2001; Makarenko and 
Durrant-Whyte, 2004; Rao et al., 1993). 
4.6.9 Data Fusion Process Model 
 Data fusion systems are highly domain specific, and there is no one-size-fits-
all solution that can be deployed without considering the specific requirements for the 
application.  Because of such diverse system requirements, it was important to 




fusion as a discipline.  This led to the development of the data-fusion process model 
which decomposes any data fusion task into a set of six subtasks, or levels. This 
general process mode is applicable across diverse application domains (Steinberg et 
al., 1999; White, 1988).   
Six sub-tasks for data-fusion processing 
Level 0:  Source Preprocessing/Data Alignment 
Level 1:  Object Refinement 
Level 2:  Situation Refinement 
Level 3:  Impact Assessment (or Threat Refinement) 
Level 4:  Process Refinement 
Level 5:  User Refinement (or Cognitive Refinement) 
 Source pre-processing is one of the most fundamental steps in any data-
fusion framework.  Here, the raw data are subjected to a set of conditioning steps to 
make them ready for fusion.  Examples of such conditioning are noise reduction for 
noisy images, color space translation (such as conversion of color images to 
monochrome images), orienting all geo-spatial data to north up, scaling all data to a 
desired range, etc.  It is important to understand that no actual fusion of data from 
different sources takes place at this level.  One particular pre-processing—data 
alignment —task deserves elaboration as it is almost ubiquitous in data fusion 
applications.  Data alignment refers to the task of bringing raw data from all the 
sensors to a common representational framework so that one can make a valid 
comparison and assess the similarities or dissimilarities among the data.  Data 




most critical steps in a data fusion pipeline.  If the alignment is incorrect; all 
subsequent analyses will produce incorrect inferences.   
 The situation gets far more complex when the sensors are heterogeneous in 
nature.  For example, if one installs microphones to detect human voices in areas 
where cameras may not be deployed or carbon dioxide sensors to get an estimate of 
the number of people, the data from all these different sensors need to be aligned 
before they can be fused to make a unified interpretation.  Aligning such disparate 
data sources is a challenging task. 
 
Level 1:  Object Refinement 
 The core task is to fuse the Level 0 data from the various data sources to 
identify items of interest.  Sensors can have different resolutions, angles of view, or 
other characteristics.  The classification step essentially groups the identified items 
into categories.  The processes used in Level 1 are highly application specific. 
 Level 1 processing becomes especially challenging when a larger number of 
items are to be tracked.  Not only does the computation complexity increase, but the 
situation injects uncertainty and ambiguity through occlusions, overlaps, and track 
intersections (Uhlmann, 1992; Bar-Shalom and Li, 1995).   
 
Level 2:  Situation Refinement 
 The goal of Level 2 is to determine relationships among the detected 




spatio-temporal events, etc.) detected in Level 1 need to be aggregated in this stage 
to obtain desired contextual knowledge. Besides aggregating target objects, it is also 
useful to aggregate the temporal information of events because the same event can 
imply a vastly different context depending on its time of occurrence. A time sequence 
also can provide insight.  A sequence of events in a specific time order can provide 
valuable contextual information about a situation.  
Level 3:  Impact Assessment  
 The essence of impact assessment is to extrapolate the situational 
awareness obtained in Level 2 to forecast the evolution of the scenario in the future.  
This requires prediction based on currently observed events and estimating the 
ramifications of those events.   
Level 4:  Process Refinement 
 In essence, process refinement is not part of any core fusion task, but it 
refers to the auxiliary task of monitoring the performance of the current fusion 
infrastructure and dynamically modifying aspects of the framework to achieve optimal 
performance.  For example, the sensors may need to be re-oriented to improve 
coverage, or the Level 1 fusion may need to be switched from a lower level fusion 
mode to a higher decision level fusion. 
   
Level 5:  User Refinement 
 Level 5 involves the process of incorporating a human-in-the-loop facility by 




fusion pipeline.  Examples of such HCI methods are information visualization, haptic 
feedback17, and verbal interaction (Preece et al., 1994). 
4.6.10 Characteristic Interdependencies 
 Any data-fusion task involves a set of subtasks.  The fusion model formalizes 
these subtasks into six levels as elaborated in section 4.6.9.  However, each of these 
levels can be decomposed further depending on the application domain.  Most of 
these subtasks represent interdependent problems.   
 The most basic interdependency is between Level 0 pre-processing and 
estimation of the various states of the target.  The uncertainty in these state 
estimates is highly dependent on the fidelity of the data-alignment task.  Any error in 
data alignment will likely be amplified in the subsequent stages of the fusion pipeline.   
 Another crucial interdependency is between the uncertainty in the final fused 
result and the uncertainty in the data gathered by the sensors.  Uncertainty in raw 
sensor data can arise from various sources, such as sensor calibration drift, 
uncertainty in the location of the sensor itself (e.g., in a GPS-denied environment), 
uncertainty in the location of a target (e.g., when the target is occluded), etc.  Such 
uncertainties, if not taken into account in the fusion process, can have significant 
impact on the accuracy of the fused output.   
 The communication bandwidth among the sensors or between a sensor and 
a fusion engine can affect the choice of fusion architecture to use. 
17 Tactile feedback such as vibrations 
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 The available power source also determines the type of fusion system to be 
deployed.  For example, in a building surveillance system, all sensors, as well as the 
fusion engine, can draw power from the buildings electrical infrastructure.  So, power 
availability is not a constraint.  Hence, they can operate almost indefinitely and be of 
a permanent nature.  However, if we want to deploy a set of temporary sensors, or 
sensors without a hard-wired power source, this will impose limits on the 
architecture. For example lightning detection solutions and in particular, the CS110 
EFM is in my case a solar powered solution.   
 Criticality of the fused product influences the architecture of the data-fusion 
system as well.  If it is imperative, for some reason, to collect data without 
interruption, it is essential to build as much redundancy into the system as possible 
within the constraints of the project. Lack of redundancy in this case, can result in 
loss of data.  
4.6.11 Typical Applications 
 Data fusion has tremendous potential in the building management domain by 
reducing the cost of day-to-day operations and maintenance through efficient 
coordination of various active components such as HVAC, electrical systems, and 
mechanical systems, as well as reducing waste of valuable resources such as water 
and power.  Operation and maintenance are usually the most expensive elements of 
a building’s life cycle expenses, and these costs usually increase over time as a 
building gets older.  An appropriate sensor fusion framework installed in a building 
can significantly reduce these costs. Bogen (Bogen et al., 2011) states that, “… 




are due to inadequate interoperability in design, engineering, facilities 
management….” A sensor suite that is properly chosen and deployed in a building 
and the appropriate fusion of the data from these sensors can provide reliable, 
accurate, and actionable near real-time information that a building operations 
manager can leverage to make decisions about the most efficient control of the 
various components.  This can result in substantial energy savings and reduced 
operational cost.   
 A key component in efficient building operations is real-time information about 
occupancy load distribution across a facility.  If the dynamic occupancy profile can be 
determined in real-time, the information can be exploited for automatic dynamic 
control of lightning, temperature, air-flow, and other indoor environmental parameters 
to provide optimal comfort for the occupants without wasting energy on maintaining 
the same level of comfort in unoccupied areas.  To determine a building-wide 
occupancy profile, it is necessary to deploy a suite of sensors of different modalities 
(such as temperature sensors, humidity sensors, visible cameras, infrared sensors, 
etc.) distributed throughout the building.  Information from these sensors could then 
be fused to produce a unified and actionable knowledge product that can be used to 
optimally control the various building systems. 
 Another area of interest in energy efficient building management is predictive 
occupancy modeling.  By discretely sampling the occupancy load distribution data 
obtained through multi-sensor fusion and archiving the data in a database over a 




occupancy patterns.  These patterns can then be used to predict spatio-temporal18 
occupancy and activate the systems appropriately to bring the relevant areas to the 
desired environmental state at the right time.   
 Human activity detection in an indoor environment has been an active area of 
research, motivated not only by energy conservation, but also by other application 
domains, such as gaming.  However, the fundamental technological advances 
resulting from these diverse research activities can be exploited in smart building 
management systems.  Coen (Coen, 1998) carried out one of the earliest instances 
of research about tracking people and activity detection in a room.  His team used 
multiple sensors to detect locations of people and their activities and offered 
automated help using artificial intelligence algorithms. Mozer (Mozer, 1999) 
developed a framework where a building learns by observing occupant behaviors 
over time.  The key differentiator of this research was that the building had the ability 
to adapt its functionality to the inhabitants’ desires and habits.  
At a finer level, data fusion can play an important role in getting reliable estimates 
about the state of a specific sub-system in a building.  For example, Huang (Huang 
et al., 2009) developed a data fusion scheme for improving the measurement of the 
cooling load in chiller plants in buildings. 
4.7 Summary 
This chapter began by reiterating our research questions originally proposed 
in Chapter 2 along with thought questions to keep in mind during the evaluation of 
18 Belonging to both space and time 
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our methodology for answering our research questions. The chapter then covered 
the highly relevant topic of sensor data fusion. Understanding this process is 
important to our research questions and broader implications of the solutions to be 
presented in Chapter 5 along with broader implications of this research to be 






Chapter 5:  Conclusions, Findings and Implications 
  
This chapter presents the research findings placing them within the context of 
the environmental and cost implications discussed in the previous chapters. The 
chapter is organized in the following manner:  Section 5.1 presents the rational for 
choosing the incumbent category of sensors and discuss the Hatchett case study. 
This will be followed by section 5.2 where I will outline the specific sensors chosen, 
the measurement system design, how the sensors and system operates as well as 
the data measured. Sensor installation – included installation verification procedures 
– is presented in Section 5.3.  The process used for the instrumentation field 
measurements is in Section 5.4 while Section 5.5 discusses the measurements and 
their implications. Section 5.6 will take a practical approach by calculating the 
potential risk reduction of such a system ($USD). Section 5.6 also presents the cost 
and benefits of the deployed lightning and charge sensor system. In the face of the 
lightning threat19, formulas and calculations will be presented that will assist 
planners, operators, and managers of large hydrocarbon storage facilities20 with the 
mitigation of the lightning threat.   
Section 5.7 will examine the usefulness of this system design to industry in 
general. The chapter concludes with section 5.8 in which I will summarize final 
thoughts and implications from this chapter concluding with final thoughts on risk if 
no further action is taken by industry.     
19 A 2014 research paper published in Science by Romps et al., University of 
California Berkley supports a 50% increase in in cloud-ground Lightning strikes 
during this century due to the realities of global warming  
20 A detailed multi-decade study of 242 hydrocarbon storage tank accidents by Chang 
et al. showed that 33% were cause by lightning. 
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5.1 Category of Sensors selected and Test Site 
 As discussed in prior chapters, there are a wide array of sensors and 
systems that were candidates for use in the experimental phase of this dissertation.  
The categories of sensors used in this research are presented in this section. 
5.1.1 Rational for sensor category selection 
 In order to answer the research questions posed in Chapter 2, the ability to 
measure an approaching lightning threat in real-time is required. As was explained in 
Chapter 4, other prominent methodologies used to measure lightning frequency and 
geolocation do exist.  
One category is used by the National Oceanigraphic and Atmospheric 
Agency (NOAA) , their National Lightning Detection Network (NLDN).  NLDN 
incorporates an array of geographically dispersed photonic (flash) detectors 
operating in a cooperative manner to geolocate and deconflict lightning flashes 
(details in Chapter 4). Unfortunately for my research I was not able to access NLDN 
data, for they will only provide raw data streams to the Government and Military. The 
public has access to processed subset data that is (at best) months old.  
The second category of lightning detection sensors leverages the radio 
emissions (3-30 KHz ) from the energetic discharge associated with a lightning 
event. As described in Chapter 4, a cooperative organization based in Germany has 
a basic solution that starts at 200 Euros. This small entry price will allow you to be a 
good citizen of the world by contributing an RF (radio frequency) emission and GPS 
(with time stamp) measurement node. This TOA (Time of Arrival) and TGOA (Time 




this is a promising solution, it is not real-time and you don’t own the data. 
Furthermore, commercial use of this data is forbidden.         
 With the incumbent solution, the user owns the data. Plus, cooperation with 
multiple devices is not required, but could be beneficial (see chapter 4; data fusion) If 
data fusion is leveraged, the atmospheric charge sensors and the tank charge 
sensors present a unique opportunity to assess the approach of a lightning and 
charge threat. The corollary is also realized though a drop in energy of the 
atmospheric charge sensor and tank charge sensor.  
5.1.2 Hatchett case study 
The primary reason for choosing the Hatchett lease battery - located near 
Midland Texas  - for this research was the easy access and availability of the battery 
tanks that were required upon which measurements could be used to determine the 
validity of answers to the research questions posed in Chapter 2.  A representative 
google earth image of the Hatchett Battery is presented as Figure 5-1. The tanks in 





Fig. 5-1. Hatchett deployment site with weather station visible 
 
Specifically, some tanks were all metal, and some were all fiberglass 
whereas one we even constructed with a fiberglass “cap” atop a steel body. The 
tanks were on the order of  500 bbl21 each in volume and were 16’ in height with 
about a 15’6’’ foot diameter. For the sake of a common reference, a tank would hold 
21,000 U.S. Gallons of crude oil if full. The fiberglass version of this tank costs about 
$16,70022 without shipping or instillation costs. At today’s WTI crude price of around 
$50 / bbl, each tank can hold $25,000 worth of crude oil. However, tank sizes range 
greatly from 27 bbl to 1000 bbl for local battery sites. --- Regional crude storage sites 
have tanks holding many thousands of bbl. ready for transport by rail (Fig. 5-2).       





                                               
 
 
Fig. 5-2. Regional crude storage for rail transportation – Rooke 2014 
5.2 Chosen sensors, their data and functionality  
I collaborated with ORNL for the selection and procurement of system 
components that met specifications for the required tests. My involvement centered 
around selection of components and the verification and calibration of the system 
following deployment. While my research questions are key to my dissertation, 
answers are also of use to PXD and other fracking production companies. 
5.2.1 Atmospheric charge sensors 
Using uniquely integrated Common Off The Shelf (COTS) components, a 
multi-parameter sensor station was developed and deployed at the Hatchett site to 
facilitate local atmospheric measurements. Some key goals and considerations are 
outlined here: 
• Measure local weather conditions. 
• Measure electric field in the local atmosphere. 




• No local power or communications available. 
 
Local weather conditions such as humidity, wind speed, and direction can be 
accurately measured with this this sensor station. More importantly, the atmospheric 
electric field can be accurately measured; results to be presented in section 5.5. In 
addition, this customized device has a lightning detector with event range monitoring. 
While the Hatchett site does have electrical power, it was not available for this 
experiment. So, a 20 watt solar panel with a rechargeable battery was used to power 
this instrument cluster. The desire was to have a standalone system that did not 
depend on the site for electrical power. Part of the reasoning behind this is the lack 
of power access in the Midland “boomtown” environment. The local utility will often 
charge around 1 Million dollars for a modest power line with grid access. Thus, 
having an independent instrument cluster is an important feature. Communications 
were accomplished every 10 minutes through a satellite directed antenna called out 





Fig. 5-2. Campbell Scientific CS110 Electric Field Meter23 
Each CS110 is calibrated in the factory in a calibration chamber as shown in Fig 5-3. 
The reciprocating shutter opens and closes during measurements. It is electrically 
connected to the ground potential and upon the shutter opening the electric field of 
the atmosphere is taken. The difference between the two measurements provides a 
user with the voltage potential difference. Thus, the degree to which the atmosphere 
is “energized” and capable of producing lightning can be considered for activation of 





                                               
 
 
Fig. 5-3. CS110 Calibration Chamber 
During calibration, Eq. 5-1 is used where data is plotted with the goal to 
obtain a R2 close as close to 1.00 as possible (strait line); in fact, the instrument is 
calibrated to this standard. The term Mparallel_plate is related to the size of the electrode 
in the CS110 and feedback from the capacitor in the charge amplifier. Whereas the 
term Oparallel_plate is in essence the measure of how “dirty” your electrode is and 
represents unwanted surface charges from non-conductive deposits on the 
electrodes.  
E = Mparallel_plate⋅V + Oparallel_plate 
Eq. 5-1 
Once in the field, the instrument must be calibrated to meet site 
specifications. The factory calibration is only valid for an instrument mounted flush 




intrusion) and general debris associated with a long-term field deployment (see 
section 5.3).  
5.2.2 Tank Sensors 
 The operational criteria for the tank sensors was a combination of proper 
dynamic range and the availability of COTS components. After literature and industry 
surveys, few commercial sensing options were identified. The search ended with the 
textile industry and Monroe Electronics. Components were ordered from Monroe and 
an electrostatic fieldmeter sensor was adapted for tank usage whereas before, the 
components were designed to monitor static charge on textile web materials. The 
installed static sensor system for tanks have the following design characteristics: 
 
• Sensors must measure electric charge at tank surface locations. 
o +/-40KV charge measurement range 
o Input resistance of > 10^12 ohms 
• Tank locations are Class 1 and Division 1 rated24. 
• No local power or communications available. 
• Flexible and easy to install. 
To accomplish these operational goals, I consulted with ORNL who then worked with 
Monroe to develop a “charge plate” concept. This was principally done to protect the 
sensor and from weather by bringing the tank surface charge to the sensor via the 
charge plate. 
24 Class I, Div. 1 – Locations where ignitable concentrations of flammable gases, 
vapors or liquids are atmospherically present on a continuous basis or often under 
normal use conditions. – NFPA 70 (National Fire Protection Association)  
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Fig. 5-4. Overview of deployed tank charge sensor 
As an added benefit, the Monroe 177A electrostatic fieldmeter could reliably monitor 
static buildup in the weather tight instrument hut. For a closer look at the electrostatic 
sensor and its isolation box, see Fig. 5-5. 
 
Fig. 5-5. Electrostatic sensor and isolation enclosure 
 
Since it is well documented by Chang (Chang and Lin, 2006) and others that 




150 km sometimes resulting in documented cases of arcs and subsequent fires. 
Thus, tank charging during storms is important to this research. Instillation location is 
a key variable that will be discussed in section 5.3.    
5.3 Installation and verification of sensors  
5.3.1 Atmospheric sensors  
I was mindful of component interoperability and the need to meet system 
requirements for this sensor deployment.  This was described in section 5.2.1, the 






                                               
 
 
Fig. 5-6. Deployed weather station with CS110 electric field meter sensor 
 
Installation of the “weather station” with an atmospheric charge (CS110) 




a Common Off The Shelf (COTS) product built by Campbell Scientific and marketed 
as an Electric Field Meter26.  
The CS110 was mounted in a slightly inverted manner has shown in Fig. 5-6. 
By doing this, the effective gain will be reduced; however, unwanted electric fields 
will also be reduced thereby enhancing the desired gain. By using Eq. 5-2 at the 
Hatchett site, I verified the R2 to be .997.  
Mcorrected = Csite⋅Mparallel_plate 
Eq. 5-2. CS110 Field calibration 
For the terms in Eq. 5-2, Mcorrected is the correct multiplier whereas Mparallel_plate is 
unique to every CS110 and independent of the site deployment. Csite is the site 
specific term and can be impacted by vegetation and other nearby objects. In 
addition, the filed calibration should be done in the absence of precipitation or foul 
weather. An example of an in-field calibration is shown in Fig. 5-7. It is common 
factor in -100 V/m as a fair weather correction factor27. 
26 http://s.campbellsci.com/documents/us/manuals/cs110.pdf 
 
27 A negative sign is used to indicate the electrostatic force on a positive charge 
exhibited by the earth. 
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Fig. 5-7. CS110 Field Calibration plot 
This infield calibration was part of the verification process. I became keenly 
aware of the need to keep electrode clean during calibration and the sensitivities the 
instrument displayed during high humidity mornings vs. dry afternoons; the 





Fig. 5-8. Alignment of satellite communication antenna – Rooke 2014 
  
Since the Hatchett site is off a dirt road, about 45 miles from the Midland 
International Airport; communication and electrical power were a concern. Providing 
power to the weather station simply involved the deployment of a 20W solar panel 
and a rechargeable battery. Due to the strong West Texas sun, this setup was 




As shown in Fig. 5-8, the station used a satellite modem for telemetry and 
transmitted measurement every 10 min. Alignment of the antenna was critical and 
was readjusted by me during the verification process. 
5.3.2 Tank charge sensors 
 
Fig. 5-9 Fiberglas tank charge sensor instillation at Hatchett 
Fiberglass tanks were of particular interest since charge measurement of 
these types of tanks was supportive to answering our research questions. As Chang 
et al. and other have pointed out, electrical storms are capable of inductively 
charging tanks from a distance of 15 – 150 km (this will be further analyzed in 




dissipate charge buildup sounds simple, as others have experienced this is not an 
absolute solution (see literature research in Chapter 3). The instillation process 
involved choosing charge “pick-up” locations across various locations on the tank. 
There was no previous published basis for mounting charge pickup locations of 
these types of battery tanks with these specific connections and associated piping.  
 
 
Fig. 5-10. Steel tank charge sensor instillation at Hatchett 
In a similar manner to the fiberglass tanks, the steel tank leveraged a similar 




of a control and not the direct object of study. Steel tanks dissipate charge buildup 
much more rapidly than fiberglass due to their inherent conductive properties.  
 
Table. 5-1 Wiring diagram of tank charge sensors 
 Table 5-1 shows the wiring diagram for the tank “pick-ups”. Charge 
information will travel along the accompanying wires to a charge transducer located 
in the instrument “hut” at Hatchett (Fig. 5-11). This building housed any weather 
sensitive instruments including the ones outlined in Fig. 5-13. 
 




Fig. 5-12 details all the major components housed in the data hut. This 
provided a weather tight and environmentally stable enclosure for sensitive 
measurement equipment.    
 
Fig. 5-12. Instruments for charge measurement of tanks 
 
5.4 Instrumentation field measurement process 
5.4.1 Atmospheric sensors 
While the deployed solution is in a constant state of operation system errors 
due sometimes occur causing system crashes. Furthermore, due to the dusty 
weather conditions of the Midland area, the CS110 requires occasional cleaning. Its 




5.4.2 Tanks charge sensors 
 The charge measurement process was highly dependent on a storm of 
adequate strength passing within the charge footprint (see Fig 5-34) Due to 
idiosyncrasies with equipment, including the Monroe 177A, system “crashes” were a 
reality. Thus, a technician was required to be local during testing, and hopefully a 
significant electrical storm would pass by during that time. 
5.5 Measurements and Implications 
The measurements obtained did indeed indicate an approaching lightning 
storm. Implications of these results support the efficacy of such a system for the 
prediction of a near-term lightning events. Further implications will be discussed in 
greater detail in sections 5.6 – 5.8 and by extension chapter 6 as a whole.  
5.5.1 Atmospheric sensors 
 The atmospheric Electric Field Monitor (EFM) was a CS110 made by 
Campbell Scientific. Thus, as expected the CS110 performed to specifications 
described in the user’s manual28 Results are shown in the following Figs. throughout 




                                               
 
 
Fig. 5-13. Measured Lightning Strikes 
Fig 5-13, helps to provide a backdrop for EFM readings with the CS110 to be 
shown in Fig. 5-14. So, when studying these results, take note of the time and date 
stamps as they correlate. By NAVSEA (U.S. Navy) 2000 V/m and NOAA standards 
of 1000 V/m correlating a lightning strike “warning”, Fig. 5-15 does indicate a 500 
V/m EFM drop about 10 minutes before lightning first strikes. Thus, the predictive 
abilities of the CS110 have been replicated in this field study. Furthermore, many 
other high V/m swings measured with the CS110 correlate with actual lightning 
strikes in the area. If the area under the plot in Fig. 5-15 is integrated, it is 
representative of the intensity of the electrical storm. However, these details have not 





Fig. 5-14. Electromagnetic Field strength during storm event 
Since the CS110 showed promise in a storm event at the end of July 2014, a long-
term experiment was setup to gauge the stability of the CS110 and its precision and 
accuracy in predicting and measuring electrical storms. Fig. 5-17 shows a test that 
gathered data for over a month. The instrument was found to present characteristics 
of accuracy, but lacked precision in the quantification of lightning strikes. This result 
was expected since deconfliction of lightning strokes can be challenging with a field 
charge sensor. This is one major advantage that the NLDN (NOAA) has since it used 
photonics and cooperative ranging and geolocation in the assignment of a unique 




Accuracy and precision can be explained as follows. If a process or 
measurement yields the same result independent of hitting a “target” than one could 
say the grouping is tight, and thus the precision is high. Where accuracy is not 
concerned with a grouping, and more concerned with the average result being on 




Fig. 5-16  Accuracy vs. Precision 
 
In Fig. 5-16. , targets 1, 2, & 3 from a good introduction to the concepts of 
accuracy and precision. Target 1 shows a marksman that on average has great 
accuracy, yet lacks precision; this would be called a poor grouping. Target 2 shows 
great precision and somewhat poor accuracy; this marksman has a tight grouping yet 
is missing the mark; better check your gun sites. Besides gun sites, another way of 
saying the same thing could be your system or instrument is repeatable, but is 
consistently incorrect in the same way.  Target 3 hits the spot; here we have both 







Fig. 5-17. Long-term field test of the CS110 
The utility of the CS110 for the quantification of lightning stoke count is 
uncertain. From the preliminary results gathered from field tests, thus far the CS110 
appears to be well suited for predicting possible lightening activity and ill-suited for 
deconflicting stroke count in highly active storms. 
5.5.2 Tank charge sensors 
Fig. 5-18. shows the mounting locations for the charge “pickups”. The lettered labels 












Fig. 5-19. Tank charge data; fair weather day (Part 1) 
 As expected, Fig. 5-19 shows data logged during fair weather conditions, 
none of the tanks showed a charge buildup. So, this data serves as a reasonable 
control for experimentation during stormy weather conditions.  
 Fig. 5-20 follows as expected and no “pickup” locations are showing 
unwarranted background charge. I now have a good baseline for experimentation 
during electrical storm events.  
 April 9th – April 13th 2015 were days of moderate storm activity around the 
Hatchett battery. As expected, Fig. 5-21 – 5-22 show some minimal levels of 
charging from some of the “pickup” locations. However, there was some level of 
disappointment since many locations did not show increased charge readings. 





Fig. 5-20 Tank charge data; fair weather day (Part 2) 
 









Fig. 5-22. Tank charge data; low intensity weather day (Part 2) 
This minimal reaction to the moderate electrical activity could be associated with 
poor “pickup” locations or the possibility of poor induction from a weak storm passing 
too far from the battery tank to make a difference.  
5.6 Potential risk reduction of system 
The true value of a solution remains unappreciated until its operational and 
financial impact are realized. As was explained in the earlier sections of this chapter, 
the lightning in charge solution is capable of providing up to a 10 minute window of 




an extra dimension of operational input for fusion with atmospheric charge sensor 
data. This sensor combination provides a unique solution to operators of large 
hydrocarbon storage tanks.  
Calculations and models presented in this section will equip project managers 
and decision makers with valuable tools for use in operations and planning. --- The 
tool tells a decision maker which sized tank to use in a specific lightning threat zone 
at a specific time in the life-cycle of a well (recall well decline curves) --- (young 
highly productive wells will get hit harder with shutdowns in operation)  
Of course, the calculations must include the "cost" of the atmospheric charge 
and tank sensors as well as the benefit they provide to the IPL (Independent 
Protection Layers) that trigger the Nitrogen tank flood.  
5.6.1 Cost of a lightning strike  
The cost of battery tanks used in the industry are shown in the following plot 
(Fig. 5-23). The scatter plot also includes a trend line to enable future formulaic 
calculations. The idea here is to get a general trend line for purposes of calculations 
to help shape cost for lightning strikes. All costs are estimated to include removal of 
a lightning damaged tank, and cleanup. Then of course, the points also include 









Fig. 5-23. Cost of replacing fiberglass gunbarrel tanks 
 
As shown in Fig. 5-23, the replacement cost includes an estimate of cleaning 
up and removing an old tank following a lightning strike. However, it is difficult to 
know the extent of damage cause from the incident, for example additional tanks 
could have been impacts during the incident and substances such as Hydrogen 
Disulfide (H2S) could have been released thus requiring additional environmental 
cleanup with hazardous material protective gear.  
As was clearly explained in in Chapter 1, fracking is a process that expends a 
large amount of diverse chemicals. So, any lightning induced fire could cause 
unforeseen secondary spills in adjacent tanks. Exact costs associated with these 
incidences are difficult to quantify. In an attempt to bound the magnitude of the 




The simulation took 1000 what-if scenarios and simulated 33 accidents for a total of 
33,000 calculations. The results of one of these sets of calculations is shown in Fig. 
5-24. Each bar in the histogram, represents the magnitude of cleanup cost 
associated with a particular accident; the lower the number, the less complicated the 
cleanup and remediation costs. 
 
Fig. 5-24. Monte Carlo simulation of 33 accidents showing cleanup magnitude 
 
 The histogram shown in Fig. 5-24 is only concentrating on the magnitude of 
the cleanup process; there is no consideration of interruptions to operations and 
production. As was explained in Chapter 1 and shown in Fig. 5-25, fracking wells 
have a production profile over their 20-30 year life. Petroleum production experts 
including Dr. Michael Economides, a University of Huston Professor who have an 
understanding of the various production profiles (Hill et al., 2012). Fig. 5-25. shows 
examples of exponential decay with varying instantaneous decline factors (Hill et 







Fig. 5-25. Well profiles with various Instantaneous Decline Factors. 
 
While Fig. 5-25. represents a very common well profile, other common 
decline curve functions enable the calculation of instantaneous production rate of 
wells; see Table 5-2. 
Curve Type Exponential Harmonic Hyperbolic 
Instantaneous 
production rate at 
time t 
𝑞𝑞(𝑝𝑝) =  𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊−𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑞𝑞(𝑝𝑝) =  
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝







Table. 5-2. Instantaneous production rates of wells (Hill et al., 2012). 
 
In Table 5-2, the terms are defined as follows: qi is the initial production rate, 




represents the production time in question. The variable n is simply equal to 1 in the 
harmonic case (and thus vanishes) whereas in the hyperbolic case n describes how 
ai changes in the out years of production.  
5.6.2 Implications to production  
By knowing the production rate of a particular well, the implications of a 
lightning strike and thus associated risk to production stoppage29 can be studied. As 
was explained in Chapter 1 & 2, a local battery is the hydrocarbon repository for 6-10 
production wells. Given this reality, an impact to the battery will affect the production 
throughput of all other wells. Furthermore, as was shown in Fig. 5-25 and Table 5-2, 
wells exhibit production rates that can be expressed in closed form solutions. So, 
with this information, we can now examine the implication of a lightning strike on the 
battery resulting in a production stoppage at time “t” for an exponential well. First, we 
will make the valid assumption that the qi for all wells supplying the battery is 1000 
bbl per day; so, given the possibility of 6-10 wells feeding this battery, its through put 
rate is 6000-10000 bbl / day assuming maximum production. As a benchmark, in the 
Bakken region of Montana and North Dakota a fracked well that starts out producing 
1000 bbl per day can decline by more than 70% by the start of the 3rd year of 
production (Tully, 2015). So from a management prospective, the production of 
fracked wells is heavily front loaded; any disruption to the production of a young well 
can have dramatic implications for production. We now translate these implications 
into an estimate of financial loss from the loss of crude oil to the fracking company. If 
the initial production rate of our wells under consideration was 1000 bbl per day and 
29 If a local battery is shutdown, production at 6-10 wells will completely stop. 
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we assume that 8 wells are feeding a battery impacted by lightning, what is the 
production loss profile of a battery assuming an exponential decay profile? 
 
 
Fig. 5-26. Implications of a lightning strike to a battery 
 
In Fig. 5-26, the implications of a lightning strike on a fracking battery quickly 
become apparent. If a lightning strike were to occur on day 365 of production, then 
the production loss over 21-days could amount to $7,747,650 with crude oil priced at 
$60 / bbl. Of course this is a raw number and does not factor in transportation of the 
product and equipment usage. However, labor is factored in since for companies like 
PXD, many employees are paid salaries since subcontracting is minimized. So, 
simply idling an otherwise productive well can be costly. 
The key point to make with the plot shown in Fig. 5-26 is that loss to 




lifecycle of a well. As an example, if we extend the same plot out and the lightning 
strike were to occur at 20-years in the lifecycle, the production loss would only be 
$61,000.  
By compiling the concepts shown in Figs. 5-23 through 5-26, we can develop 
a relationship that shows the total loss from a lightning strike to a fracking battery 
(Eq. 5-3.) 
 
𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 $𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈 𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑎 𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊
= 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝐸𝐸𝑞𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐸𝐸𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
+ 𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝 𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞 +𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎 𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 
Eq. 5-3. Financial Implications of a battery lightning strike 





Fig. 5-27 Incidences of cloud-ground across the United States30 
  
By reviewing Fig. 5-27, it becomes clear that the lightning threat is regional.  
Now the shale play map produced by the EIA is presented in Fig. 5-28 for study. 
Special note should be taken of current and prospective shale plays. 
 
Fig. 5-28. Current and prospective U.S. shale plays in 2015 based on the EIA31 
Fig. 5-29 is an overlay of Figs. 5-27 & 5-28, after examination it becomes 









                                               
 
plays. Moreover, a closer inspection of Fig. 5-29 indicates that planned fracking 
plays in the Deep South closely align with the lightning threat. The superimposed 
maps solidify the case for lightning as a present and increasing threat for fracking 
(Fig. 5-29).   
To complete the trifecta, a detailed study published in Science in 2014 by a 
Berkley research group indicates that due to global warming, calculations indicate a 
50% increase in cloud-ground lightning events over this century (Romps et al., 
2014). ---In light of these 3 factors, the implications are clear; lightning presents a 
credible and growing threat to the fracking industry.  
 




 While the lightning overlay looks attractive, there is also a methodology 
behind their construction. They are based on flash detection via an array of NOAA-
NLDN32 optical sensors; additional details are listed below.33  
NLDN Network Specifications 
• Thunderstorm detection efficiency in excess of 99% 
• Flash detection efficiency greater than 95% 
• Median location accuracy of 150-250m or better 
• Network uptimes nearing 99.99% 
• Data feed uptimes of better than 99.9% 
• Event timing precision of 1 microsecond RMS 
• Accurate peak current measurements 
• Accurate cloud / cloud to ground classification 
 
However, it is important to note that data from the NLDN is only available in 
raw from to U.S. Military and Government. The public has access to processed data 
that is often several months to a year old. For instance, this dissertation only includes 
Lightning data from Hatchett up until the end of 2014. --- So, the NLDN while 
sophisticated, does not provide raw data feeds in real-time to the public and is 
therefore limited in its utility for current storm events.  
 
 By inspecting Fig. 5-29 it becomes apparent that the Lightning threat is 
regional and obviously, fracking operations are stationary. So, for purposes of a 
32 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA); National Lightning 






                                               
 
credible threat to fracking operations, Lightning is a local concern. For calculation 
purposes, NOAA through its contractor VAISALA has a repository of Lightning strike 
data for regional areas going back to 1986.  VAISALA calculates the number of 
cloud-ground lightning strikes per day and records this data in 4 km Albers Equal 
Area grids34 that cover the Unites States.  
My test site was Hatchett lease. The lease is a 340 acre area that housed 
several fracking wells and my test battery. The exact coordinates of the test site are 
32.321953, -101.882291 by dropping these coordinates directly into the search box 
of NOAA’s Service Weather Data Inventory site35, Lightning strike data for a 25 sq. 
mile “tile” can be obtained; this very example is shown in Fig. 5-30.  
34 Albers equal-area conic projection, is (named after Heinrich C. Albers), conic, 
equal area map projection that leverages 2 standard parallels or in our case 25 sq. mile 





                                               
 
 
Fig. 5-30 Lightning strike data by day; Hatchett test battery 
 
Knowing the historical Lightning activity just one year, is not entirely useful. 
Given this, I have complied daily Lightning activity for the Hatchett “tile” over the past 
15 years. This information consisted 370 lightning event days with most days having 
more than one recorded lightning flash see Fig. 5-31. While the graph is detailed and 
seasonal patterns are clear, data in the format has limited use to answer our 





Fig. 5-31. Daily Lightning activity at Hatchett over 15 years 
  
In order to answer our research questions, the data used to construct Fig. 5-
31 must be modified to show the relative Lightning threat per month; knowing will be 
much more useful to a planner and operator. Indeed, this has been done in Fig. 5-32.  
With the approach to understanding monthly totals, it is possible to develop a 
Lightning risk profile for the Hatchett location unique to a particular month. Obviously 
since this is the Southwestern United States, the warmer months of March – October 
have the most electrical storm activity. If we now glance back at Fig. 5-31, evidently, 
the ferocity of some electrical storms is profound while others are either far off in the 
distance or merely a whimper in comparison. Some storms in June exhibited more 
than 300 flashes while many others only registered in the single digits or even only 1 






Fig. 5-32. Total flash counts at Hatchett per month over 15 years 
 
Fig. 5-31. Is quite revealing; over a 15-year period, the months have large viabilities 
in electrical storm activity. Moreover, some days in the most energetic month of June 
might only have 1-5 flashes where some notable days has over 300. The key point 
here is that while as expected, March – October have the most electrical storm 
activity, assigning an average for a particular month while useful, does not provide 
the whole picture.  Figure 5-31 provides more useful information that will be used to 





Fig. 5-33. Average lightning events per month at Hatchett 
 
Table 5-3 shows the monthly average Lightning flashes per month over a 15 year 
period for Hatchett. The standard deviation varies greatly between months and most 
notably is largest in the peak months of lightning activity. Fig. 5-34 helps to display 
this dramatic level of difference in storm intensity; it is not surprising that the 
standard deviation is high in these months. --- The month of November has the 
highest, but this is due to the very small storm count, and the skewing properties of 







Fig. 5-34. Flash counts of storm events during peak months over 15 years 
 
If we make the reasonable assumption that most thunderstorms in the Midland, TX 
area (near Hatchett) pass at similar speeds, then logically more electrical activity is 
concentrated in the same block of time for the active summer months.  
 




Thus, in the stronger storms of the summer, more lightning risk is compressed in the 
same block of time. So, risk follows this pattern and is concentrated more in the 
summer months. Any mitigation strategy through and IPL (Independent Protection 
Layer) will have the greatest risk mitigation vs. cost benefit in these highly active 
months. A mitigation strategy will be discussed in section 5.7 that will account for this 
reality.  
5.6.4 Risk and costing it all out 
As was described in detail in section 5.4.1, the cost to a nominal 8 well 
fracking operation could amount to $7,747,650 from the temporary shutdown of the 
battery and subsequent production disruptions.  Of course, that is not the totally 
potential financial losses; we now revisit Eq. 5-3 and now build Table 5-4 for a more 
complete picture of cost.   
 
Table 5-4. Potential cost of a Lightning strike at day of 365 production 
 
 Most costs in Table 5-4 depend upon basic calculations that can be backed 
up in an easily explainable manner. The public relations, reputation, and in turn the 
USD Comments
Production Loss  $      7,747,650 Section 5.4.1 and Fig. 5-13
Equipment Loss and Replacement  $           83,906 
Fig 5-10, y=114.74X + 26536; assume 
500 bbl tank
Loss of Product  $           30,000 assume $60 / bbl and 500 bbl tank
Hazardous Cleanup  $           99,000 
Average cleanup cost based on 33,000 
Monte Carlo simulated tank accidents; 
Fig. 5-11.
Public relations; reputation; added 
regulation? Unknown?
BP is still paying for a 5 year old 
disaster today; they "will make it right"
TOTAL potential cost of                            




potential for added regulation costs are mostly beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
With that said, for a large company with a brand to protect, along with the persistent 
gaze of regulators and the “frack no” public, the costs could exceed the production 
loss. In relation to the the BP Deepwater Horizon spill, besides 14.3 Billion in cleanup 
costs (Gilbert, 2014), another consequence of the disaster hit BP at the pump with a 
26% loss in profit margins following the oil spill (Barrage et al., 2014). From the 
standpoint of environmental fines alone, a judge in a 2014 court decision imposed a 
$4,300 per barrel of crude spilled under the Clean Water Act which equates to $18 
Billion USD (Gilbert, 2014). 
 
 
Fig 5-35. Current cost of BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill (Q2 2014) (Gilbert, 2014). 
5.6.5 Direct Lightning strike and charge induction risks 
 As Chang et al. outlines, the direct lightning strike zone is between 100 and 
10 m and out of 80 Lightning tank accidents studied, 12 tanks were impacts in this 




was hit with a direct strike in October of 1995 resulting in $50 million (2015 USD) in 
property damages. --- It took 20 months for the refinery to recover to full production.  
 While direct strikes are dramatic, a more sinister threat is tank charge 
induction. The massive charge energy from an electrical storm has an induction 
footprint of 15 to 150 sq km. Thus, from a probability prospective, the charge 
induction threat is of significant concern.  
For our calculations, we will make the reasonable assumption that 90% of the NLDN 
flashes recorded are within the 15 to 150 sq km window since our “tile” is 25 sq. 
miles
 
Fig. 5-36 Charge induction area according to Chang et al. (Chang and Lin, 2006) in 
relation to our tile 
 
 Given this simple overlay of charge induction upon our NLDN tile, through 
simple geometric calculations, at least 76% of the NLDN recorded flashes are within 
the charge induction zone. For example, if we use the values shown in Table 5-3, 
then for the month of July, part of the 25 square mile tile will be under the induction 
zone 17 times. We now generate a table to show the average number of induction 
zone days for each month at Hatchett (Table 5-5). This simply show then number of 






Table 5-5. Average number of induction zone events per month 
 
 At the beginning of this section, we note that a direct strike radius has a 
damage reach of up to 100 m which is the same as 31,416 sq. meters or 0.0314 sq. 
km. Given that the area of a battery is conveniently around this area, our calculation 
would appear simple; however, there are many storage batteries in a 25 sq mile tile. 
For instance, it is easy to count 30 such storage batteries surrounding the Hatchett 
site. However, we step back and look at just 1 tank; a general equation for the 
probability of a direct strike on any tank in the tile is shown in Eq. 5-2.  
  
𝐶𝐶 =  
𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊 𝑍𝑍𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒 𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ
𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊 𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑊𝑊
 
Eq. 5-4 Probability of a direct lightning strike; given month and site 
 
By taking Eq. 5-4 and inserting our values shown in Table 5-5., we are able to 
generate Table 5-6 which shows the risk of a direct battery strike in a given month at 
Hatchett site        




Induction zone events 
















Hatchett. --- keeping mind that this is for only one battery. As was previously stated, 
the 25 sq. km tile area has several battery facilities.  
 
 
Table 5-6. Probability of a one battery strike on a battery at Hatchett 
By assuming that all direct strikes result in deviation, the balance of our calculations 
will be show a potential worst case scenario for a fracking operator such as PXD. 
5.6.6 Summary Costs  
The $7,960,556 number from Table 5-4 will now be revisited. With that value 
in mind, a financial risk exposure table will now be calculated with the values in Table 
5-6 to give us Table 5-7. 
Hackett site        
15 years of 
lightning data Average 
Probability of 1 battery 


















Table 5-7. Cost of direct strike risk for 1 battery at Hatchett 
 
So, the cost of risk exposure varies greatly between seasons. As such, a 365 day 
operating schedule for a mitigation system makes little economic sense. For 
example, months December – February could be used for system maintenance.  
 For a final cost basis, our mitigation system cannot exceed $1,640,000 in 
annual expenses including amortized CAPEX and ongoing maintenance. As was 
previously stated, this risk exposure cost is for only on battery. If the final lightening 
mitigation IPL and system can cover multiple batteries with limited additional cost, 
then it would be highly valued. 
Hatchett site        
15 years of 
lightning data Average 
Probability of 1 battery 
being in the strike zone 
during the month
Cost of exposure 
to lighting risk 
(Direct Strike)
JAN 0.3 0.0001 1,029.44$                 
FEB 1.1 0.0005 4,117.77$                 
MAR 21.2 0.0103 81,840.66$               
APR 23.8 0.0115 91,877.73$               
MAY 32.7 0.0158 126,106.68$            
JUN 127.7 0.0619 493,102.86$            
JUL 66.1 0.0321 255,301.69$            
AUG 72.3 0.0351 279,236.22$            
SEP 29.4 0.0143 113,496.01$            
OCT 33.1 0.0161 127,908.21$            
NOV 14.6 0.0071 56,361.97$               
DEC 2.5 0.0012 9,779.70$                 




 5.7   Lightning impact mitigation and the application to 
industry  
Real-time prediction of possible Lightning events at the battery is of limited 
value if there is no mitigation strategy. In this section, we present a mitigation 
strategy and the associated IPLs. Furthermore, I will show how triggered IPLs will 
introduce Nitrogen flooding for lightning impact mitigation. 
IPLs were detailed in sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 under the guise of Fire and 
Gas Safety systems (FGS) and Emergency Shut Down (ESD)36. Within these 
sections, design standards for these systems were described and summarized in 
Table 2-5. The IPL and mitigation solution presented herein follows portions of the 
IEC 61511-2 standard. The lightning strike preparation and mitigation strategy to be 
described parallels the functionality of a FGS and EDS system as was shown Figs. 
2-8 and 2-9. and shown here again for purposes of discussion. As was described in 
sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, both FGS and EDS systems are widely deployed in 
industrial settings and built upon the rigger of the IEC 61511 standard.  
 
 
36 By convention, Shutdown is broken into two separate words to follow the acronym 
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Fig. 5-37. Modeling risk in FGS systems (Kenexis, 2013). 
  
“An alarm system can be used as a method of risk reduction by reducing the demand 
rate on the SIS37 providing: 
• the sensor used for the alarm system is not used for control purposes where 
loss of control would lead to a demand on the SIF38; 
• the sensor used for the alarm system is not used as part of the SIS; 
(Instrumentation, 2004) 
When deciding if risk reduction is required, it becomes necessary to establish safety 
and environmental targets. These targets might be aligned to a certain site or 
operator and will be compared to the level of risk without additional safety functions. 
  
37 Safety Instrumented System  
38 Safety Instrumented Function 
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Once the need for risk reduction is established, it becomes necessary to 
identify the required functions that mitigate and return to a safe state. The functions 
may be described in generic terms without details to particular technologies (this will 
be relegated to IEC 61508; see Table 2-5).  
 
For alignment with IEC 61511, the hazard and risk analysis should consider the 
following: 
• “each determined hazardous event and the event sequences that contribute 
to it;” 
• “the consequences and likelihood of the event sequences with which each 
hazardous event is associated; these may be expressed quantitatively or 
qualitatively;” 
• “the measures taken to reduce or remove hazards and risks;” 
• “the assumptions made during the analysis of the risks, including the 
estimated demand rates and equipment failure rates; any credit taken for 
operational constraints or human intervention should be 
detailed;”(Instrumentation, 2004) 
 
The IEC 61511 clearly states that designing an architecture is an iterative 
process and designs will change as more details become available (Instrumentation, 
2004). 
5.7.1 Nitrogen flooding for mitigation 
 Nitrogen is an inert gas that displaces oxygen from the combustion triangle 




it is known that a signal from the decision and fusion engine with inputs from 
atmospheric charge and tank charge sensors will trigger the IPL (see Chapter 4 for 
details on sensors and fusion). By reviewing Fig. 5-37 and considering Fig. 5-38, the 





Fig. 5-38. IPL equations 
 
If we assign realistic probabilities of 80% effectiveness or 0.20 to S1 (tank charge 
sensor) and 90% effectiveness or 0.10 to S2 (atmospheric charge sensor), we can 
calculate the combined effectiveness of our IPL(s). The term “Fi” is simply the 
probability of the event occurring if there is no protection. --- So without completing 
the calculation, it is easy to see that an IPL configuration will help to mitigate almost 
all of the Lightning induced fire threat.  
 This works well in equation form, but how would it work in the field? Or by 
extension other hydrocarbon storage facilities such as large jet fuel storage centers 
or oil refineries?  
 The most likely method is to have a centrally located source of Liquid 
Nitrogen with evaporators. Ubiquitous poly-ethylene tubing could transfer nitrogen to 
all batteries within a reasonable distance.  
 Since sensor information from one atmospheric charge sensor can cover 
several square miles of area, several batteries can be monitored with only one 
atmospheric sensor. Even more importantly, a more advanced system can leverage 
Fi*(F1+S1*F2) = Residual Risk (per unit time) 
Fi*(S1*S2) = Mitigated Risk (per unit time) 




sensor fusion methodologies (described in Chapter 4) to setup voting between 
sensors including tank charge sensors and other atmospheric sensors.  
In the proceeding sections of Chapter 5, many foundational calculations were 
made describing the lightning threat at the Hatchett site. In addition, lightning threats 
and trends for the future were also presented. The culmination of many of the 
calculations is shown in Table 5-8. It is important to note that “A” was calculated 
based on consideration of unmitigated risk and sensor performance. Following this, 
column “B” considered the cost of a battery strike ($7,960,556 from Table 5-4) in light 
of results from column “A”.   
 










Unmitigated risk - 
Probability of 1 
battery being in the 
strike zone during 
the month
Fi*(F1+S1*F2) 
Residual Risk per 
month
Residual Risk Cost 
following Nirtogen 
Mitigation
JAN 0.3 0.0001 0.00004 288.24$                      
FEB 1.1 0.0005 0.00014 1,152.98$                  
MAR 21.2 0.0103 0.00288 22,915.39$                
APR 23.8 0.0115 0.00323 25,725.76$                
MAY 32.7 0.0158 0.00444 35,309.87$                
JUN 127.7 0.0619 0.01734 138,068.80$              
JUL 66.1 0.0321 0.00898 71,484.47$                
AUG 72.3 0.0351 0.00982 78,186.14$                
SEP 29.4 0.0143 0.00399 31,778.88$                
OCT 33.1 0.0161 0.00450 35,814.30$                
NOV 14.6 0.0071 0.00198 15,781.35$                
DEC 2.5 0.0012 0.00034 2,738.32$                  





Loss from 1 lightning strike 
including all presented factors 
Mitigation solution reduces 
annualize risk cost to… 
$10 million per direct strike $459,000 per tank 
Saves the fracking industry close to 
$1.2 million in annual risk cost 
exposure per battery tank 
Table 5-9. Bottom-line impact of mitigation solution 
5.7.2 Proposed architecture and costs 
 Development of an architecture must consider the operational constraints of 
such a system also with considerations for cost. As was previously outlined in 
section 5.6.3, the lightning risk follows seasonal patterns. However, the intensity of 
storms and their associated durations varies significantly; this is particularly true in 
the summer months. Any proposed solution must account for this operationally 
reality.  An architecture is now presented which will allow for long periods of dynamic 
nitrogen flooding of hydrocarbon tanks during high lightning risk days while also 
seamlessly functioning in low event days; see Fig. 5-39.   
 Take note of Fig. 5-17; trigger thresholds are set at the absolute value of 
1000 V/m2 for a charge on the EFM sensor. Once this threshold (established by 
NASA for its Launch Pad Lightning Warning System - LPLWS) is crossed the system 





Fig. 5-39. Architecture for Mitigative solution 
 Once a predetermined lighting risk threshold is crossed, a signal is sent from 
the EFM sensor station to a centrally located nitrogen source. In Fig. 5-39, liquid 
nitrogen is shown, but the nitrogen could simply be compressed gas. In the latter 
case, nitrogen loss due to storage alone would be eliminated. Cryogenic storage 
tanks such as Liquid Nitrogen tanks are given a NER% rating for storage efficiency. 
In general, the larger the tank, the less percent is loss to static evaporation alone; a 
typical NER% rating is 1.539 where NER stands for the daily Normal Evaporation 
Rate in % per day at 70 degrees Fahrenheit and 1 atmosphere of pressure. Ideally, 
this value of 1.5% NER should be considered when calculating the cost of a liquid 




                                               
 
nitrogen costs range from $0.06 - $0.10 USD per liter; this cost depends greatly on 
the location for delivery.   
 For calculations herein, the cost of $0.10 USD per liter will be considered 
which equates to the same cost for 1500 liters of nitrogen gas when evaporated at 
Standard Temperature and Pressure. It is assumed that the 500 bbl hydrocarbon 
storage battery tanks are 75% full on average; the presented nitrogen mitigation 
solution will be required to displace 125 bbl of headspace with nitrogen gas per 
system activation event. As was explained earlier, 1 bbl is 42 U.S. Gallons or 159.6 
letters; thereby giving us a headspace volume of 159.6 liters for the 4 hydrocarbon 
battery tanks at Hatchett. An additional assumption is that nitrogen gas will purge 
rapidly upon initial activation and then slowly during the munities surrounding 
triggering events; this will result in nitrogen consumption amounting to 10 times this 
volume or 1596 liters. As explained earlier in this section, that volume of gaseous 
nitrogen would expend about 1 liter of LN2 (liquid nitrogen) amounting to an expense 
of $.10 USD. More importantly, as indicated in Table 5-3, the average monthly 
lighting flash count over a 15 year period for Hatchett is 15. We will assume that 
each of these flashes activates the mitigation solution. Thus, the monthly liquid 
nitrogen consumption will be 15 liters per battery or 150 liters for 10 batteries. At 
$1.50 per liter including delivery, this amounts to a $225 monthly expense for LN2 for 
lightning mitigation alone.  There will be more monthly nitrogen loss due to a NER% 
per day of 1.5 than consumed in say a 500 liter LN2 tank. Specifically, 182 liters per 
month amounting to $273 worth of LN2 per month. Thus, the total expenditures for 
LN2 per month for both mitigation and NER is $498. 
 An alternative solution is to have compressed nitrogen cylinders at each of 10 




loss. Plus there is no CAPEX for the instillation of long runs of polyethylene tubing. 
Each battery would receive alarm and signaling information from the EFM station via 
the wireless telemetry link. Pricing for compressed nitrogen gas cylinders with 
delivery is about $.30 per cubic foot which is $.01 per liter. By using the same logic in 
relation to the number of triggering events shown earlier in this section, there will be 
22,500 liters on average of nitrogen gas consumed per battery per month at 
Hatchett. For expense purposes, this equates to 795 cubic feet or $239 per month.  
 In summary, the CAPX for the liquid nitrogen based solution is $405,000 
including an LN2 orca for storage along with polyethylene tubing. Whereas the 
CAPEX can be minimized to only $105,000 for a compressed nitrogen solution since 
no polyethylene runs are required. The monthly operational expenditures for the LN2 
solution are $3637 and the compressed nitrogen solution is $3378. 
 By equating all this information to daily dollar values, and plotting them in Fig. 
5-40, it becomes apparent that the daily expense for both the LN2 and compressed 
nitrogen solutions are far below the value of the crude oil produced; even at year 20 
of production. The driving factors in making a decision are the CAPEX for both 
solutions presented earlier in this section. The plot clearly shows that the solution 







Fig. 5-40. Daily value of production for 8 wells vs. daily cost of LN2 and nitrogen 
mitigation solutions. 
 
 Thus, the basic concept of this architecture for lighting mitigation in the 






In chapter 5, I answered the first 2 research questions posed in Chapter 2 by 
applying the methodologies discussed in Chapter 4.  I didn’t see this at all.  Now I am 
skim reading the document.  But you need to call out explicitly something like: 
Research Question 1 posed in Chapter 2 read as follows: Is there a way to 
use sensors and modeling to help minimize the financial and environmental losses 
and issues?  If so, could it be automated? 
This family of questions has been answered through the assessment of risk 
cost basis thought this chapter. My mitigation solution was clearly shown to reduce 
the annualized risk cost basis for an operating fracking well (Table 5-8)  In addition, 
fundamental equations were presented that govern the automation of IPL mitigation 
systems (Fig 5-36) These equations were present in the context of standards 
including IEC 61511 in preparation for automation and validation. 
 
In order to answer this fundamental question, a number of associated questions 
must be answered, including: 
 
2.) Develop the driving equations of the intersecting items, such as: 
• probability of lightning strikes,  
• cost of an environmental incident (pollutant dependent) 
• well production estimation (temporal dependent) 
• cost to incumbent organization for an incident (cost to fracking company) 
Question 2 was answered in within chapter 5 as follows. The probability of a lightning 
strike was examined in detail in section 5.6.3. The cost of an environmental incident 




Fig. 5-35 which extends to a $2.15 million by using the same logic on a 500 bbl 
battery tank. Well production estimates based on the age of the well was presented 
in Section 5.6.2. Plus, the cost of an unmitigated direct strike on a tank was 
discussed in Section 5.6.4  
 
*** If implemented, in a functional IPL mitigation system, these answers will 
save the hydro fracking industry $1.64 million in risk cost exposure per battery 
tank in the Midland lightning risk zone (Table 5-7). *** 
 
Lightning has been a documented threat to hydrocarbon storage facilities for 
over 100 years. There have been no disruptive solutions presented or implemented 
to remove Lightning as a concern. A detailed study by Chang shows that 33% of 241 
tank accidents were caused by lightning (Chang and Lin, 2006).  
 As was detailed in Chapter 2, researchers have concluded that cloud-ground 
Lightning strikes are likely to increase by 50% over the current decade due to global 
warming (Romps et al., 2014) Furthermore, the combination of Lightning risk maps 
(NOAA) and prospective shale plays (EIA) shown in Chapter 2 help highlight the 
importance of Lightning risk mitigation for the future of hydro fracking operations.  
My methodology can be extend to other Lightning threat areas and even 
other processes and facilities beyond hydro fracking. This research work has carved 
a path forward for the integration of sensors in safety critical systems (SCS) for hydro 
fracking and storage facilities. This contribution to the body of knowledge along with 
the broader implications that will be explored further in Chapter 6 will serve as a 




5.8.1 Risk conclusions and mitigation  
A direct strike on a battery tank can be devastating both financially and 
environmentally.  The probabilities of such an occurrence – as presented in this 
chapter - are sobering. Without a lightning effect mitigation system for hydrocarbon 
storage systems, tank fires and chemical spillages will continue in hydrocarbon 









Chapter 6:  Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
6.1 Research Summary 
 Lightning has stood as an unresolved threat to hydrocarbon storage facilities 
for over 100 years. Literature research has shown that 33% of all modern 
hydrocarbon tank accidents are due to lightning (Chang and Lin, 2006); in addition, 
cloud-ground lightning strikes are predicted to increase by 50% this century (Romps 
et al., 2014). An overlay of the current National Lightning Detection Network (NLDN) 
risk map and the Energy Information Administration shale play map clearly show the 
lightning threat only increasing with the migration of future shale activities. While 
planning may change, shale deposits and regional lightning threats are not changing 
geographically; this research quantifies the threat and outlines clear lightning 
mitigation strategies.  
 Furthermore, real-time detection and the associated methodology of lightning 
mitigation have implications for industries far beyond hydro fracking. By leveraging 
industrial standards for Fire and Gas Systems (FGS) such as IEC 61511, the 
proposed lightning effects mitigation system has a pathway toward verification and 
eventual validation at a broad array of industrial sites. Some extended applications 
included Navy fuel storage depots and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) facilities as 




Recommendations include the deployment of Lightning and charge sensor 
systems at candidate sites for completion of the V&V40 process through operational 
system verification of software and hardware with IEC 61508 and ANSI/ISA S84.  
6.2 Conclusions 
 I have concluded that a lightning strike on a hydro fracking battery has the 
potential to cause $8.0 million in lost productivity and cleanup costs (assume $60/bbl 
oil). This does not even factor in a possible $4,300 per bbl41 fine that was recently 
imposed in an oil spill case for violation of the Clean Water Act (Gilbert, 2014). For a 
nominal 500 bbl tank at a hydro fracking battery, that amounts to $2.2 million in fines 
alone. So, the total loss for one lightning strike on a fracking battery can exceed $10 
million dollars. 
 From a risk cost prospective, the annual financial exposure varies by location 
and age of wells involved. For our case study at Hatchett, the annual productivity risk 
cost exposure for just one direct lightning strike exceeds $1.6 million (accounting for 
lightning likelihood and 1 year old wells). Thus, any mitigation solution presented 
must have a smaller annualized cost basis per hydrocarbon tank to be considered.  
Validation of my lightning mitigation system with IEC 61511 and IPL42 
principles for FGS43 systems has shown that the annual residual risk cost is reduced 
to $50,000 per battery tank. 
40 Verification and Validation 
41 bbl is shorthand for barrel where one U.S. bbl of oil is 42 U.S. gallons. 
42 Independent Protection Layer (see Chapter 2) 
43 Fire and Gas System (or Solution; see Chapter 2) 
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Lightning striking a large hydrocarbon facility such as an oil refinery can have  
catastrophic consequences; in one such case, direct property losses totaled $56 
million (2014 USD)  with unpublished losses in productivity lasting years (Mahoney, 
1997).   Lightning is a fact of nature however, a direct strike can be mitigated, and as 
shown my solution will dramatically reduce risk cost exposure.  
6.3 Validation of Assumptions, Appropriateness of Analysis 
Methodology, and Interpretation of Results.  
 It was assumed that real-time lightning sensor systems with associated strike 
mitigation were viable from a technical and cost basis. This assumption was 
validated though calculations for lightning risk cost, IEC 61511, and IPL performance 
calculations. It was further assumed that deployed atmospheric lightning sensors and 
tank charge sensors will serve as a critical component of the lightning mitigation 
IPLs. Sensors for atmospheric charge were validated through field deployments and 
subsequent performance to NAVSEA44 and NOAA charge standards. Tank charge 
sensors showed some promise in field tests, yet lacked sufficient results to be 
validated with any standard level of performance or functionality.    
 Analysis methodologies leveraged for this research played a key role in 
answering our research questions. Calculations of geographically specific lightning 
threats highlighted the expected risk exposure with no mitigation. Deployment of both 
real-time lightning prediction sensors and charge tank sensors demonstrated a basis 
for a mitigation strategy.      
44 Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) 
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6.4 Contributions to the Body of Knowledge 
To date, there have been no scholarly research papers exploring the nexus of 
sensors for real-time detection of lightning threats for hydro fracking operations while 
considering fracked well productivity. Even more importantly, there has been no 
research showing how sensors can predict a near-time lightning threat and invoke 
low cost mitigative strategies in the event of a direct strike or discharge. Lightning is 
a persist threat to hydrocarbon storage tanks. Solutions were presented that if 
implemented, will save hydrocarbon storage and processing companies millions in 
loss avoidance from unmitigated lightning strikes. 
The presented lightning detection and mitigation solution will have a direct 
impact on the risk cost profile of hydro fracking operations. I detailed a lightning 
mitigation solution based on sensors deployed to measure the lightning threat and 
charge buildup on operating hydro fracking battery tanks. This field research was 
performed at an operating hydro fracking battery of a multi-billion dollar fracking 
company. This research included the systems engineering of sensor systems for 
lightning threat detection and tank charge measurement.  
Furthermore, the risk cost basis for lightning exposure at the Hatchett battery 
site was assessed and implications for risk were presented. A methodology was 
developed to calculate the lightning risk cost basis at any site in the United States. 
Moreover, this developed methodology can be used to asses lightning risk in hydro 
fracking operations at a given stage in the lifecycle of a well; this provides an 
important tool for planners.  
A pathway toward extension of these solutions to a broader class of problems 
beyond hydro fracking operations has been prepared. Large hydrocarbon storage 




reduced their lightning exposure through rigorous safety engineering and 
standards.45 However, accidents form lightning strikes have occurred with 
catastrophic consequences (Mahoney, 1997; Chang and Lin, 2006). The 
methodology and technology developed in the course of this research will have a 
direct play in large-scale hydrocarbon storage facilities. Deployment of the 
researched solutions presented here, will have profoundly positive implications on 
the lightning cost risk curve at these large storage facilities.   
 
Fig. 6-1. Large hydrocarbon storage facilities; Navy refueling and LNG terminals 
 
The United States is still considering specifics Laws for LNG terminal exclusion 
zones and working to understand the consequences of leaks in relations to 
explosions or fires (Havens and Spicer, 2007). This uncertainty in regulation and 
disaster response makes these massive facilities particularly vulnerable to 
unmitigated lightning strikes.  
 
Research Question 3 was presented in Chapter 2 as follows. 
45 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 30 and others 
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3.) What are the broader implications for sensors and lightning detection 
beyond hydro fracking hydrocarbon storage?  
Clearly, chapter 6 has shown the broader implications of solutions presented in 
Chapter 5. Section 6.4 discussed contributions to the body of knowledge and how 
these answers present solutions for large-scale hydrocarbon storage facilities. As an 
example a lightning strike on a large-scale hydrocarbon site resulted in $56 million in 
damages from infrastructure alone (Section 6.2). 
6.5 Recommendations for Future Research 
 During the course of this dissertation research, I found technology areas that 
could potentially be used in future research investigations into this area.  I 
recommend that any installation utilizing a system that includes the current Electric 
Field Monitor (CS110) system deployed at Hatchett should be interfaced with an IPL 
emulator. This will represent the beginning of the verification process and where 
software and hardware will be deployed and tested in accordance with IEC 61508 
and ANSI/ISA S84. In particular, software and hardware will be designed with 
detailed operational realities at the core of development.  
Lightning Mapping Array (LMA) technology can be used to assess the 
intensity and 3D attributes of electrical storms in real-time. The growth or decay of a 
storm can be assessed with this technology. Virtualized images with <50 m feature 
resolution are regenerated by leveraging natural VHF radio emissions from lightning 
discharges to render dynamic 4D46 images (Goodman et al., 2005). The principal 
advantage of LMA technology is the ability to understand total lightning data and 
46 3D with a time component  
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separate intra-cloud lightning from cloud-ground discharges. While the data is not 
presented anywhere near-real time – and therefore isn’t immediately useful for a 
short occurrence warning it is anticipated that LMA research will result in systems 
that will help forecasters assess the metamorphosis of an electrical storm in real-
time. By analyzing total lightning data, a 3-5 min warning can be provided before the 
first cloud-ground strike.47 
 Furthermore, I recommend that the petroleum industry should establish 
Public Private Partnerships (PPP) with curators of LMA systems including NOAA and 
NASA. By establishing these relationships, the petroleum industry can gain access to 
live LMA feeds for further study and eventual implementation for lightning mitigation 
(as described thought this dissertation). Furthermore, the government will gain 
valuable knowledge with potential applications for lightning mitigation at military 








47 NASA, Short-term Prediction Research and Transition Center 
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